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FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF MINNEAPOLIS;  AND FEDERAL  RESERVE 
BANK  OF MINNEAPOLIS  AND U.C.L.A. 
Re-examining  the  Contributions  of 
Money  and  Banking  Shocks  to  the 
U.  S.  Great  Depression 
1. Introduction 
Many economists  argue that deflation  can account for much of the Great 
Depression  (1929-1933)  in the  United  States.  According  to this story, a 
sharp decline  in the money  supply  caused  rapid deflation,  which  in turn 
reduced  output.  Empirical research  has  documented  large decreases  in 
money,  prices, and output between  1929 and 1933. But there is much less 
work assessing  whether  this shock can plausibly  account for the Depres- 
sion  within  fully  articulated  general  equilibrium  models.  This  paper 
quantitatively  evaluates  the deflation  hypothesis  with  dynamic,  general 
equilibrium  business-cycle  models. 
Evaluating  the  deflation  hypothesis  with  general  equilibrium  models 
requires an explicit  theory  of why  deflation  reduced  output  so much  in 
the  1930s. Since there are several  explanations  for this in the literature, 
we  first  narrow  the  field  by  requiring  that  any  successful  deflation 
theory of the Depression  also be consistent  with macroeconomic  activity 
during  other major deflations.  We therefore  determine  which  deflation 
theories  satisfy  this  criterion  by  comparing  the  Great Depression  with 
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macroeconomic  activity  during  the  early  1920s,  which  is  a period  of 
comparable  deflation,  but  a  much  less  severe  downturn  in  economic 
activity. 
We find that two  of the four most popular  explanations  are ruled out 
by this consistency  criterion.  These  are the surprise-deflation  story of Lu- 
cas  and  Rapping  (1969), which  argues  that  the  Great Depression  was 
severe  because  the deflation  was unexpected,  and the debt-deflation  story 
of  Irving  Fisher  (1933),  which  argues  that  the  Great  Depression  was 
severe  because  deflation  substantially  raised  the  real value  of  private 
debt.  The two  stories that are not ruled out are the high-wage  story and 
the banking  story. According  to the high-wage story, deflation,  combined 
with  imperfectly  flexible wages,  raised real wages  and reduced  employ- 
ment  and  output.  A number  of economists  report evidence  in favor of 
this story, including  Eichengreen  and Sachs (1985), Bernanke and Carey 
(1996),  and  Bordo,  Erceg,  and  Evans  (2000).  According  to  the  banking 
story, deflationary  money  shocks  contributed  to bank  failures  and  to a 
reduction  in  the  efficiency  of  financial  intermediation,  which  in  turn 
reduced  lending  and output.  Bernanke  (1983) reports evidence  in favor 
of this story. 
Following  this empirical analysis,  we develop  two general equilibrium 
models  to separately  evaluate  the wage  shock hypothesis  and the bank- 
ing  shock  hypothesis.  We ask  two  questions:  Can  these  shocks  drive 
down  output  per  adult  nearly  40% relative  to trend between  1929 and 
1933? Are the other predictions  of the theories  consistent  with  the data? 
Our main finding  is that wage  shocks  and banking  shocks  account for 
a small  fraction of the  Great Depression.  We also  find  that some  other 
predictions  of the  theories  are at variance  with  the  data.  We conclude 
that  these  results  raise  questions  about  the  deflation  and banking  hy- 
potheses  as explanations  of the  Great Depression  in the United  States. 
The paper is organized  as follows.  Section  2 presents  the comparison 
between  the  Great Depression  and  the  1921-1922  Depression,  and  the 
evaluation  of the four popular deflation stories for the Great Depression. 
We then go on to develop  general equilibrium  models  for the two stories 
that are not ruled out by this comparison-the  high-wage  story and the 
banking  story.  Section  3  presents  a  general  equilibrium  model  with 
above-market  wages,  and also presents  a quantitative  assessment  of the 
wage  hypothesis.  Section  4 presents  a general  equilibrium  model  with 
an  intermediation  sector  to  assess  the  macroeconomic  impact  of bank 
failures.  Since  our results  support  neither  the  wage  nor banking  story, 
Section  5 briefly  discuss  two  other possible  contributing  factors  to the 
Great Depression:  changes  in asset  prices  and changes  in productivity. 
Section  6 presents  a summary  and conclusion. Re-examining  the Contributions  of Money and Banking  Shocks ? 185 
Table 1  DEFLATION AND  OUTPUT-OUTPUT  AND  ITS COMPONENTSa 
Depression  of 1921-1922  (1920 =  100)  Great  Depression (1929 =  100) 
Year  P  Y  C  I  Year  P  Y  C  I 
1921  85.2  93.9  102.4  86.1  1930  97.5  86.9  90.0  73.2 
1922  80.6  96.2  102.7  114.4  1931  88.5  77.6  84.3  48.5 
1932  79.5  64.0  74.3  26.7 
1933  77.5  60.9  70.8  23.0 
aThe  price level is from Romer  (1988)  for 1921-1923,  and from Bureau  of the Census (1975)  for 1929- 
1933. The output data for 1920-1922  are from Kendrick  (1961,  p. 294). Romer  (1988)  argues that the 
Kendrick  series is a better output measure for the 1920s than the Commerce  Department  measure, 
which is based on preliminary  work of Kuznets  and Kendrick.  The output data for 1929-1933  are from 
the National  Income  and Product  Accounts.  The population  data are from  Bureau  of the Census (1975, 
p. 10). 
2. An Empirical  Puzzle  about  the  Deflation  Hypothesis 
A  successful  theory  of  the  Great  Depression  based  on  deflation  should 
account  for macroeconomic  activity  during  1929-1933  and  should  also  be 
consistent  with  macroeconomic  activity  during  other  major  deflations. 
This  section  empirically  evaluates  this  consistency  requirement  by  com- 
paring  changes  in  prices  and  real  output  during  1929-1933  to  those 
during  a period  of comparable  deflation:  1920-1922. 
Table  1 shows  the  percentage  change  in the  GNP  deflator  (P), real GNP 
(Y),  real  consumption  (C),  and  real  investment  (I) during  these  two  epi- 
sodes.  The  three  quantity  variables  are deflated  by their  specific  deflators, 
are  measured  relative  to  the  adult  (16  and  over)  population,  and  are 
detrended.1  Deflation  is similar  during  these  two  periods:  the  price  level 
fell  about  20% between  1920  and  1922,  and  also  fell  about  20% between 
1929  and  1932.  Despite  these  similar  deflations,  however,  output  fell 
much  more  between  1929  and  1932  than  between  1920  and  1922.  Real 
GNP  fell 36% between  1929 and  1932,  but just  4% between  1920 and  1922. 
These  data  raise  a puzzle  about  the  deflation  hypothesis:  If the  20% 
deflation  of  the  1930s  caused  the  Great  Depression,  why  didn't  the  20% 
deflation  of  the  1920s  also  cause  a  major  depression?  Resolving  this 
puzzle  requires  finding  some  other  shock(s)  that  magnify  the  depressing 
effects  of  deflation  and  that  were  present  in  the  1930s,  but  not  in  the 
1920s.  There  are  several  stories  for  why  the  1930s  deflation  had  such 
1. We detrended these three quantity  variables  at a rate of 1.9%  per year. We define this 
rate as normal  growth, because it is the growth rate of output per adult both before the 
Great Depression (1919-1929), and after World  War  II (1947-1997), and because it is 
close to the 2%  average  growth rate  between 1900  and 1997.  It is also worth noting that 
output per adult in 1929  is very close to an OLS trend line fitted to this series between 
1900 and 1997. This suggests that output was close to its normal trend value in 1929. 186 *  COLE  & OHANIAN 
large, negative  real effects.  But can these  stories  explain  why  the Great 
Depression  was  so  much  worse  than  the  1921-1922  Depression?  We 
address  this question  in the next section. 
2.1 CAN THE  STANDARD  STORIES  EXPLAIN  THE  SEVERITY  OF 
THE  GREAT  DEPRESSION? 
Four popular  deflation  stories for the Great Depression  are: (1) the defla- 
tion  was  unexpected,  (2) nominal  debt  levels  were  high,  (3) nominal 
wages  were  imperfectly  flexible,  and  (4) there were  many  bank failures 
in addition  to the deflation.  We consider  each of these  stories in turn and 
ask whether  they  might  be  consistent  with  both  the  Great Depression 
and the 1921-1922  Depression.  For each story, this consistency  requires 
that the shock that magnified  the real effect of deflation  in the 1930s not 
be present  in the 1920s. 
2.1.1  Differences in  Deflation  Predictability between  the  1920s, and  the 
1930s  Some theories predict that only unanticipated  deflation depresses 
real economic  activity.  Lucas  and  Rapping  (1969) argue  that the  1930s 
deflation  was  unexpected  and that this was  an important  factor behind 
the severity of the Great Depression.  Can differences  in the predictability 
of the 1920s and 1930s deflations  explain  the difference  in the severity  of 
these  two depressions?  We address  this question  by comparing  nominal 
and ex post  real interest rates between  these  two periods.2 If differences 
in the predictability  of deflation  can explain  both  the  Great Depression 
and the Depression  of 1921-1922,  we  should  observe  very low  nominal 
interest  rates in the  1920s, but relatively  high  nominal  and ex post  real 
interest  rates during the 1930s. 
Table 2 shows  average  annual nominal  and real interest rates on 3- to 
6-month U.S. Treasury notes  and certificates. The real rate is the nominal 
rate minus  the percentage  change  in the annual GNP deflator. The most 
striking feature of these  data is that both nominal  and real interest rates 
are higher  during  the Depression  of 1921-22.  The average  nominal  rate 
on Treasury securities  is 4.35% between  1921 and 1922, compared  to an 
average  of 1.1% between  1930 and  1933. The average  real rate on these 
securities  is 14.25% between  1921 and  1922, compared  to an average  of 
7.21% between  1930 and 1930.3 These  data suggest  that the 1930s defla- 
2. There is some work addressing the predictability  of the 1930s deflation (see Hamilton, 
1992,  and Cecchetti,  1992),  but we are unaware  of any studies of the predictability  of the 
deflation  of the early 1920s,  or any comparison  of the predictability  of deflation  between 
the two periods. 
3. It may seem surprising  that the deflation  of the early 1920s  was more unexpected, since 
monetary  policy after wars traditionally  produced deflation. However, the timing and 
rates of those deflations  were probably  much less certain. Re-examining  the  Contributions  of  Money  and  Banking  Shocks  *  187 
Table 2  NOMINAL  AND  EX POST REAL INTEREST  RATES: 1920s 
AND  1930sa 
Depression  of 1921  Great  Depression 
Interest  rate  (%)  Interest  rate  (%) 
Year  Nominal  Real  Year  Nominal  Real 
1921  4.83  19.63  1930  2.23  4.73 
1922  3.47  8.87  1931  1.15  10.38 
1932  0.78  10.95 
1933  0.26  2.78 
Avg.  4.35  14.25  Avg.  1.10  7.21 
aThe  data  are  from  Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System  (1943).  The  results  are  very similar 
using 4-6-month prime  commercial  paper. 
tion was  more predictable  than the  1920s deflation,  rather than less pre- 
dictable.  We conclude  from these  data that unexpected  deflation  is not 
the key factor behind  the relative severity  of the Great Depression.4 
2.1.2  Differences in Private Debt and Deflation between the 1920s and 1930s 
Fisher (1933) suggested  that deflation  and high  private  debt levels  con- 
tributed to the Great Depression  by reducing  borrower wealth  and con- 
straining  lending.  This is known  as the debt-deflation view  of the Great 
Depression.  Before  asking  whether  this  story  is  consistent  with  both 
depressions,  it  is  important  to  note  that  there  are  two  separate 
macroeconomic  effects  from  this  redistribution.  We  call  one  the  debt- 
burden effect of debt  and  deflation,  which  is Fisher's  original view.  The 
other is the wealth-transfer  effect, in which  unexpected  deflation  transfers 
wealth  from  debtors  to  creditors.  On  average,  creditors  are older  and 
borrowers  are younger.  This transfer increases  the old generation's  con- 
sumption,  but  changes  their labor input  little  in  absolute  terms,  since 
their labor endowment  is low. The wealth  transfer will tend  to increase 
the  hours  of  the  young  generation.  Overall,  the  wealth-transfer  effect 
should  increase  aggregate  hours  and  output  and  thus  will  tend  to off- 
set  the  debt-burden  effect.  Thus,  there  is  no  theoretical  presumption 
that wealth  redistributions  between  debtors  and creditors reduce aggre- 
gate employment  and output. 
If the debt-deflation  story can explain the severity of the Great Depres- 
sion,  the  debt-burden  effect  must  be  quantitatively  much  more impor- 
4. Some  economists  have  also  suggested  that high  real interest  rates were  an important 
contributing factor to the Great Depression.  The fact that real interest rates were substan- 
tially higher during  the 1921-1922  Depression  casts doubt  on this explanation. 188 *  COLE & OHANIAN 
Table 3  INCREASE IN THE PRIVATE DEBT BURDEN DUE TO DEFLATION: 
THE DEPRESSION OF 1921-1922  VS. THE GREAT DEPRESSIONa 
Increase  in 
Private  debt  A (price  level)  debt  burden  A GNP  in 
relative  in  first 2 years  in  first 2 years  first 2 years 
Year  to output  of deflation  (%)  of deflation  of deflation  (%) 
1920  1.20  -19.4  0.29  -3.8 
1929  1.56  -11.5  0.20  -22.4 
aThe increase in the debt burden  is given  by 
100D/Y 
100 +  %AP 
where  D is the  debt-to-output  ratio. There are two  basic  sources  of data on business  liabilities  in the 
Historical Statistics (Bureau of the Census,  1975). The first is the nominal  debt series put out by the BEA, 
which  we  have  used.  The second  is from IRS data on corporate tax returns (see series V 108-140).  The 
IRS data only begin  in 1926, and there appears  to be a significant  difference  in the indicated  increase in 
corporate debt levels  between  the two sources.  The IRS data indicate that corporate debt in the form of 
bonded  debt and mortgages  rose 47% between  1926 and 1929. This figure seems  too large and suggests 
that the coverage  level  was  initially low  when  the IRS was  first collecting  the returns data. This view  is 
supported  by  the  observation  that according  to the  IRS data  the  total debt  of the  corporate  sector- 
including  notes,  accounts  payable,  bonded  debt,  and mortgages-was  only $55.8 billion in 1926, while 
the net debt from the BEA for the total corporate sector in 1926 was $76.2 billion. 
tant in the  1930s than in the  1920s. Two factors that affect the quantita- 
tive  extent  of  the  debt-burden  effect  are the  size  of  the  stock  of  debt 
at the start of the deflation  and the pattern  of deflation.  A larger initial 
stock  of debt  and  a rapid  deflation  will  tend  to increase  the  effect.  We 
measure  the increase in the debt burden  as the increase in the real value 
of debt  (relative  to output)  due  to deflation  over  the  first two  years  of 
each depression. 
Table 3 shows  the initial stock of debt relative  to output  at the price- 
level peak prior to each depression,  as well  as the percentage  change  in 
prices  in the first two  years  of each depression,  the implied  percentage 
increase in the debt burden  relative to initial output,  and the percentage 
change  in  real output.  The  most  striking  feature  of  these  data  is  that 
the debt-burden  channel  rises more in 1921-1922  than in 1929-1931.  The 
more  rapid  1920s deflation  increased  the  debt burden  by 0.29 between 
1920 and  1922,  compared  to  0.20 between  1929 and  1931. This  larger 
debt-burden  increase,  however,  is  associated  with  a much  smaller  de- 
crease  in output.  Real GNP falls 3.8% between  1920 and  1922, but falls 
22.4% between  1929 and 1931. 
Explaining  the  severity  of  the  Great  Depression  through  debt  and 
deflation  thus requires a model  in which  an initial debt stock of 1.2, with 
19% deflation,  is associated  with only a 4% decrease  in output,  while  an 
initial  debt  stock  of  1.56,  with  11% deflation,  drives  down  output  by Re-examining  the  Contributions  of Money  and  Banking  Shocks  *  189 
more  than 22%.5 We are unaware  of any quantitatively  plausible  model 
that is consistent  with  these  observations.  We conclude  from these  data 
that the debt-deflation  story does not explain why  the Great Depression 
was worse  than the 1921-1922  Depression.6 
2.1.3  Differences in Wages between the 1920s and the 1930s  Some  econo- 
mists believe  that wage changes  increased the depressing  effects of defla- 
tion  in  the  1930s. Before  addressing  whether  differences  in wages  can 
explain the difference between  the Great Depression  and the Depression 
of 1921-1922,  it is important to recognize  that there is disagreement  over 
how wage  changes  may have contributed  to the Great Depression.  Some 
economists,  for example  Lucas  and  Rapping  (1972) and  Lucas  (1983), 
argue that the Great Depression  was  severe  because  nominal  wages  fell 
so much. Others,  for example  Bernanke and Carey (1996), Bordo, Erceg, 
and  Evans  (2000),  and  Eichengreen  and  Sachs  (1985),  argue  that  the 
Great Depression  was  severe  because  nominal  wages  were  imperfectly 
flexible and did not fall enough. 
Since Lucas and Rapping's view  is based on unexpected  deflation,  and 
it is unlikely  that unexpected  deflation  is responsible  for the severity  of 
the Great Depression,  we  focus  on the inflexible-wage  hypothesis.  Ac- 
cording  to  this  hypothesis,  inflexible  nominal  wages,  combined  with 
deflation,  raised real wages,  which  reduced  employment  and output. 
Explaining  the relative severity  of the Great Depression  through  high 
wages  requires:  (1) real wages  well  above  the  trend  in the  1930s,  and 
significantly  higher  than wages  in  1921-1922,  and  (2) a theory  of labor 
market failure during the 1930s-if  the Great Depression  was caused by 
high real wages,  there would  have been enormous  competitive  pressure 
for wages  to fall. 
We begin by examining  wages  between  the two depressions.  Unfortu- 
nately, there are few survey wage  data that are both of reasonable quality 
and  consistently  available  during  both  the  1920s  and  the  1930s.  Two 
sectors for which  such data are available are agriculture and manufactur- 
ing.  Tables 4 and 5 show  that detrended  wage  changes  are fairly similar 
5. Olney  (1999) argues that high  consumer  debt levels  and extreme  default  penalties  help 
account  for the  large  drop  in consumption  in  1930. If this  indebtedness  was  key,  we 
would  expect  a larger than  normal  decrease  in consumer  durables  spending  in  1930. 
However,  the  decrease  in  the  ratio of  durables  to  output  in  1930 is  small  relative  to 
postwar  recessions.  The major decrease  in consumption  in 1930 is due  to nondurables 
and services. 
6. It is worth  noting  that the  difference  in debt  levels  between  the  two  periods-1.2  vs. 
1.56-may  overstate  the  actual  difference  in the  debt-burden  channel,  since  financial 
markets  were  probably  more  sophisticated  in the  1930s,  and  as a consequence  might 
have managed  larger debt levels  more efficiently. 190 *  COLE & OHANIAN 
Table 4  FARM WAGESa 
Depression  of 1921-1922  Great  Depression 
Real wage  Real wage 
Year  (1920 =  100)  Year  (1929 =  100) 
1921  71.9  1930  93.0 
1922  73.1  1931  76.8 
1932  64.7 
1933  60.2 
aSource:  Bureau  of the Census (1975,  p. 468). The farm  wage rate  is the daily wage without room and 
board.  It is deflated  by the GNP deflator  and is detrended  at 1.4%/yr,  as that  is the average  growth  rate 
of real  hourly  compensation  between 1947  and 1997. 
Table 5  MANUFACTURING  AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGSa 
Depression  of 1921-1922  Great  Depression 
Real wage  Real wage 
Year  (1920 =  100)  Year  (1929) =  100) 
1921  101.5  1930  102.1 
1922  101.2  1931  106.8 
1932  106.5 
1933  104.2 
aThese  data are deflated by the GNP deflator.  We detrended manufacturing  wages at a 1.4%  annual 
rate,  as that  is the average  growth  rate  of real  hourly  compensation  between 1947  and 1997.  The average 
growth  rate  of real  manufacturing  wages between 1923  and 1929  was slightly  higher at 1.6%/yr. 
between  the two  episodes  and that wage  changes  differed  significantly 
across sectors  of the economy.  Some real wages  fell substantially  during 
both  depressions,  while  others  remained  near trend.  The wage  in the 
farm sector is an example  of one  real wage  that fell significantly  during 
both depressions.  Table 4 shows  that, on average,  it is about 28% below 
trend during both periods. 
In contrast,  the  real  manufacturing  wage  rose  modestly  during  the 
Great Depression  and remained  near trend in 1921-1922.  Table 5 shows 
the  manufacturing  wage  during  these  two  depressions.  The basic data 
for the  Great Depression  are from  surveys  conducted  by  the  National 
Industrial  Conference  Board, and  are considered  to be  among  the best 
wage  measures  during  the  Great Depression.7  The real manufacturing 
7. The 1930s data are from Hanes (1996).  The 1920s  data are from the National Industrial 
Conference  Board (1928)  and Beney (1936)  and include average hourly earnings of all 
wage earners in 25 industries plus anthracite  mining, railroads, and building trades. 
Industries  include metal, textiles, leather, paper, furniture,  lumber, meat, and rubber. 
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wage,  on  average,  was  roughly  5% above  trend during  1930-1933  and 
about 1% above  trend during  the Depression  of 1921-1922. 
These  manufacturing  wage  differences  between  the  1920s and  1930s 
do not seem large enough  to account for the relative severity of the Great 
Depression.  But without  a formal model  we  do not know  how  much  of 
the  Great Depression  these  differences  can explain.  We therefore  con- 
struct a two-sector  general  equilibrium  model  in Section  3 to assess  the 
quantitative  contribution  of  high  wages  in  some  sectors  to  the  Great 
Depression. 
2.1.4  Differences in Bank Closings between the 1920s and the 1930s  Many 
banks either temporarily suspended  operations  or failed during the early 
1930s.  Bernanke's  (1983) widely  cited  work  shows  that the  number  of 
banks that either closed  temporarily  or failed is a significant predictor of 
output  during the Great Depression.  Bernanke's work has led a number 
of economists  to conclude  that bank closings  were an important contrib- 
uting factor to the Great Depression.  For example,  Romer's (1993) survey 
of the Great Depression  argues  that these  closings  were  responsible  for 
much  of  the  fall in  output  between  1930 and  1933.  According  to  the 
bank-closing  hypothesis,  bank  suspensions  and  failures  destroyed  pri- 
vate information  about borrowers,  which  in turn reduced  the efficiency 
of financial intermediation  (see Romer, 1993). 
Can bank closings  explain  the  difference  between  the  Great Depres- 
sion  and  the  1921-1922  Depression?  Table 6 presents  a comparison  of 
bank  closings  in  the  1920s and  1930s.  Since  the  importance  of  a bank 
suspension  or failure depends  on the size of the bank, we measure bank 
closings  not by the number  of banks that closed,  but rather by the frac- 
tion of deposits  in banks that either suspended  operations  or failed. The 
table thus  shows  the fraction of total deposits  in commercial  banks that 
either  suspended  operations  or failed,  and  shows  the  fraction of total 
deposits  lost by depositors.8 
Bank suspensions  and failures were  higher  during  the Great Depres- 
sion.  About  0.5% of  banks,  measured  by  deposits,  either  suspended 
operations  or failed during the Depression  of 1921-1922,  and about 0.2% 
of total deposits  was  ultimately  lost.  In comparison,  an average  of 2.6% 
of banks either suspended  operations  or failed between  1930-1932,  and 
an  average  of  0.4%  of  total  deposits  was  ultimately  lost  during  that 
8. Since deposits  at failed and suspended  banks  are only  available  for commercial banks, 
we  show  this ratio relative to commercial  deposits.  Commercial  deposits  accounted  for 
over 85% of total deposits  during 1919-1923  and over 80% during 1929-1934.  We include 
failures  and  suspensions  together  because  we  are unaware  of  any  data  that separate 
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Table 6  BEHAVIOR OF COMMERCIAL BANK DEPOSITSa 
Depression  of 1921-1922  Great  Depression 
Susp.  Loss  Susp.  Loss 
total  total  Total  total  total  Total 
Year  (%)  (%)  output  Year  (%)  (%)  output 
1921  0.5  0.2  0.52  1929  0.4  0.1  0.58 
1922  0.3  0.1  0.55  1930  1.7  0.5  0.64 
1931  4.3  0.8  0.65 
1932  2.0  0.4  0.78 
1933  11.0  1.3  0.75 
aSource:  Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System (1943). 
period.  Both  of  these  ratios  rose  significantly  in  1933 when  President 
Franklin Roosevelt  declared a bank holiday.  An explicit economic  model 
is needed  to determine  the quantitative  importance  of these  differences 
for the  severity  of the  Great Depression.  We develop  a model  for this 
purpose  in Section 4. 
The  final  data we  present  are on  the  ratio of  total commercial  bank 
deposits  to output  during  these  two depressions.  This ratio rises signifi- 
cantly during the Great Depression.  We present  these  data because  they 
will  be  a key  in  the  model  that  we  develop  for  assessing  the  macro- 
economic  impact of bank closings. 
2.2  SUMMARY 
This section  has assessed  whether  four popular  deflation  stories for the 
Great Depression  can explain  why  the  20% deflation  of the  1930s pro- 
duced  the  Great Depression,  and  why  the  20% deflation  of  the  1920s 
produced  a much milder downturn.  For any of these  stories to be consis- 
tent with  both  depressions  requires that the story be quantitatively  im- 
portant  during  the  1930s,  but  quantitatively  unimportant  during  the 
1920s. We found  that two  of these  four stories-unexpected  deflation, 
and  debt plus  deflation-do  not  satisfy  this  criterion, and therefore  do 
not seem  capable of explaining  the relative severity  of the Great Depres- 
sion.  For the  other  two  stories-imperfectly  flexible  wages  and  bank 
failures-we  did find some  differences between  the 1920s and 1930s. We 
now  develop  two models-one  for assessing  the role of inflexible nomi- 
nal wages,  and one  for assessing  the role of banking  shocks-to  evalu- 
ate quantitatively  how  much  these  two  factors contributed  to the Great 
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3. How  Much  of the  Great  Depression  Was  Due 
to High Wages? 
3.1 A TWO-SECTOR  GENERAL  EQUILIBRIUM  MODEL 
This section presents  a general equilibrium model to quantitatively assess 
the macroeconomic  effects  of high wages.  Since wages  in some  sectors, 
such  as  agriculture,  were  flexible,  we  develop  a two-sector  model  in 
which the wage in one sector is fixed above the market-clearing level, and 
the wage  in the other sector is flexible. We assume  that the fixed wage  in 
the distorted sector is equal to the manufacturing wage; this assumption  is 
discussed  in detail below.  All labor hired in that sector must be paid the 
above-market wage.  This approach captures the basic distorting effects of 
above-market  wages  but allows  us to abstract from other monetary  fea- 
tures  that  would  complicate  the  environment.  All  other  prices  in  the 
economy,  including  the wages  in the nondistorted  sector, adjust to equate 
supply  and demand  in the other markets. 
We first summarize  the  physical  environment.  We then  analyze  the 
pure market-clearing version  of the model with no wage  distortions,  and 
then  analyze  the model  with  above-market  wages  in the manufacturing 
sector. 
3.1.1  Environment  Time  is  denoted  by  t =  0,1,2,  ...  There  is a repre- 
sentative  family  with  many  members.  Family  members  supply  labor, 
consume  a single  physical  good,  and accumulate  physical  capital. There 
are two  distinct  types  of physical  goods:  Final goods are the numeraire, 
and  can be  either  consumed  or invested  to augment  the  capital stock. 
These  final  goods  are produced  using  two  types  of  intermediate  goods. 
Each intermediate  good  is produced  from a distinct  sector.  We denote 
the  sector  that will be  distorted  by  the  above-market  wage  as sector m, 
and the nondistorted  sector as sector  n. We denote  the output  of the final 
good by Y, and the output of the two intermediate  goods by Yi, where  i = 
m, n. These  two intermediate  goods  are produced  using  identical Cobb- 
Douglas  technologies  with  capital, denoted  by K, and labor, denoted  by 
Hi,  for  i  =  m,  n.  The  parameter  A  is  labor-augmenting  technological 
change. 
Capital  and  labor are both  sector-specific-neither  labor nor  capital 
can move  from one sector to the other. Thus, workers who  are unable to 
work  as much  as they wish  in the distorted  sector are not permitted  to 
move  to the nondistorted  sector. This assumption  amplifies  the distort- 
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3.1.2  Technologies  The technology  for producing  the intermediate  good 
m is 
Ym  =  (AHm)1-  Km. 
The same technology  is used  to produce  the intermediate  good  n: 
Y  =  (AHn)1  -Kf. 
The technology  for final goods  is a CES aggregate  of the two intermedi- 
ate goods: 
Y =[aYf  +  (1 -  a)Y]V  .  (1) 
3.1.3  The  Market-Clearing  Model 
THE  HOUSEHOLD'S  PROBLEM There is a representative  household  with 
many members.  At date 0, it is assumed  that half of the family members 
work  in  the  m sector,  and  half  work  in  the  n sector.  The household's 
preferences  over  sequences  of  consumption  of  the  final  good  ct and 
market time in the two  sectors is given  by9 
00 
max E  t{log  (ct) +  B [log(  -  hmt)  +  I log(1  -  h,t)]}.  (2) 
The  household  owns  the  capital  stock  and  chooses  consumption  (ct), 
work effort in the two sectors (hmt  and hn), and investment  (x,t  and x,,) to 
maximize  (2) subject  to the  following  present-value  budget  constraint, 
capital accumulation  constraint,  and time constraint: 
E Qt[wmthmt +  wnhnt-  Ct +  rmkmt +  rntk  Xmt 
- 
XntJ  ,  (3) 
t=O 
kit+l  = xit +  (1 -  8)kit,  i E {m, n}.  (4) 
The wage  rates in the  m and  n sectors  are denoted  w,  and w,,  respec- 
tively, and the rental prices of capital in the two sectors are analogously 
9. This preference  specification  with different  utility  weights on leisure  permits  us to retain 
the tractability  of a representative-agent  formulation.  The different utility weights are 
required  when employment  is different  between the two sectors (e.g. a # 0.5). It can be 
shown that this specification  is equivalent  to an environment  with agents who work in 
either  sectors  m  or sector  n, and who are  perfectly  insured  against  idiosyncratic  shocks to 
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denoted  rm  and  r,. Note  that the  parameter  f captures  the  relative  size 
difference  in  employment  for  the  household.  The  date-t  price  of  the 
physical  good  in terms of date-0 goods  is denoted  by Qt. 
THE  INTERMEDIATE-GOOD  FIRMS'  PROBLEM  We assume that there is a single 
producer  of  the  m intermediate  good,  and  a single  producer  of  the  n 
intermediate  good,  both  of  whom  behave  competitively.'0  The  inter- 
mediate-good  producer in sector i, i E {m, n}, maximizes  profits given (p, 
Wi,  ri): 
maxpik.h'-  -  wihi -  riki.  (5) 
ni,ki 
The first-order conditions  for hiring the inputs  imply that factor prices 
are equated  to the value  of marginal products. 
THE  FINAL-GOOD  FIRMS'  PROBLEM  The final-good  producer  also is com- 
petitive.  The maximization  problem is: 
max [aYt  +  (1 -  a)Y]"  -  pYm  -  Pnn.  (6) 
Ym,  Yn 
EQUILIBRIUM  CONDITIONS  A competitive  equilibrium  for this  economy 
consists  of  sequences  of  allocations  and  a price  system  such  that  the 
allocations  solve  the  household's  problem  subject  to  its  budget  con- 
straint and  given  prices;  that the  allocations  solve  the  firm's problem, 
given  prices; that the labor market,  the capital-services  market, and the 
intermediate-good  markets all clear; that the resource constraint is satis- 
fied; and that prices are equal to marginal productivities. 
3.1.4  The  Model with Some Wages  above  the Market-Clearing  Level  We now 
modify  our model  so  that the wage  in sector m is set above  its market- 
clearing level.  Rather than develop  a monetary  model  with  fixed nomi- 
nal  wages  and  deflation,  we  adopt  a much  simpler  specification  that 
captures  the  distorting  effects  of  above-market  wages.  At  the  start of 
period  t the wage  is fixed exogenously  for that period at a level  above its 
normal market-clearing level.  We denote  this fixed wage by wmt. All labor 
hired  in this sector at date  t must  be paid  this wage.  The above-market 
wage  is a completely  unexpected  shock each period." 
10. We assume a single firm that behaves competitively,  rather  than a large number of 
competitive  firms, to economize on notation. 
11. There  are many ways to model household beliefs about future distortions  to manufac- 
turing  wages. Our approach,  in which households believe that the fixed  manufacturing 
wage does not recur,  treats  each wage shock as a completely  unexpected  event. As we 196 *  COLE  & OHANIAN 
The fixed wage  changes  our model  in one key way: labor input in this 
sector is no longer a choice variable for the household.12 The households 
are rationed in terms of their labor supply  to this sector: 
B  Wmt 
1  - 
hmt  Ct 
Labor input  in  the  distorted  sector  is  determined  by  firms'  labor  de- 
mand.  The representative  firm hires labor until the fixed wage  is equated 
to labor's value  of marginal product: 
(1  -  )Pmt(Kmt/Hmt)  =  Wmt  (7) 
The high  wage  has direct and indirect effects  on aggregate  output.  We 
define  the  direct effect  as the  change  in aggregate  output  from the  in- 
crease in the distorted  wage,  holding  all other prices fixed. This effect is 
measured  by solving  for Ym  from (7), given  wmt  and holding  Pmt  fixed,  and 
then  solving  for  aggregate  output,  holding  y,  fixed.  The  indirect,  or 
general equilibrium,  effects of the high wage  operate through changes  in 
prices and the other wage.  These indirect effects depend  not only on wmt, 
but also on all the model  parameters.  Assessing  the quantitative  effects 
of the high manufacturing  wage  on the economy  thus requires choosing 
parameter  values  and  numerically  computing  the  equilibrium  path  of 
the model  economy. 
3.2 CHOOSING  PARAMETER  VALUES  AND COMPUTING 
AN EQUILIBRIUM 
3.2.1  Technology  and Preference  Parameter  Values  Several  of the  parame- 
ters in our model  are commonly  used  in the equilibrium-business-cycle 
literature.  We  choose  values  for  these  parameters  that  are  similar  to 
values  in  other  studies.  Since  the  data  are available  at an  annual  fre- 
quency, we  define  the unit of time in the model  to be one year. 
The common  parameters in our model are /3, A, B, 8, and 0. We set/3  = 
0.96, which is comparable to values used in other studies.  We assume  that 
the level of technological  progress,  A, is given by At = (1 + g)t, and choose 
g = 0.02. Our values for  3  and g imply a steady-state  interest rate of about 
show  later, this approach  simplifies  computing  the equilibrium  considerably.  This ap- 
proach  is also  consistent  with  the  prevailing  view  that the  Great Depression  was  the 
result of unexpected  shocks. 
12. Since no other markets  are distorted,  all other equations  in the model  will continue  to 
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6%. We choose  B such  that the household  works  about one-third  of its 
discretionary  time in the steady state. The additional  leisure parameter iq 
is chosen  so that in the undistorted  version  of the model,  the household 
chooses  to allocate  the  appropriate  fraction of labor to each  sector at a 
common  wage.  We set  0 = 0.33,  and the depreciation  rate to 7%. 
The final parameter we  discuss  in this section  is X, which  governs  the 
substitution  elasticity between  the two sectors in final-good  production. 
Since  manufacturing  appears  to be  a key  sector  distorted  by  the  high 
wage  during the Depression,  we use postwar  data on changes  in manu- 
facturing's  expenditure  share and relative price to choose  a value  for  p. 
Manufacturing's  expenditure  share  and  relative  price  have  both  fallen 
over the postwar  period,  which  is consistent  with  a substitution  elastic- 
ity between  manufacturing  and nonmanufacturing  of less than one.  We 
choose  a benchmark  value  of  (  =  -1,  which  implies  a  substitution 
elasticity  of  0.5.  We also  conduct  our  analysis  with  a low  substitution 
elasticity  of 0.1 to assess  the robustness  of our results. 
3.2.2  The  Distorted Wage  and the Relative  Size of the Distorted  Sector  Finally, 
we need to choose  a measure of how much real wages rose in the distorted 
sector,  and  we  need  to choose  a value  for the  fraction of the  economy 
distorted by the high wage. 
We use Hanes's  (1996) compilation  of the Conference Board's manufac- 
turing  wage  data  as the  measure  of the  wage  for the  distorted  sector. 
This wage  is shown  in Table 5 for each year of the Great Depression.  The 
Conference  Board wage  data have also been used in some other analyses 
of  the  Great  Depression,  including  O'Brien  (1989),  Lebergott  (1991), 
Bernanke (1986), and Bernanke and Carey (1996). This wage  is the most 
natural choice for a distorted  wage  in this study, because  the data are of 
relatively high quality, and because  there is a plausible economic explana- 
tion for why  manufacturing  wages  were  above  market clearing  despite 
the downturn  in economic  activity: government  intervention.  This inter- 
vention  comes  from President  Herbert Hoover's  belief  that maintaining 
nominal  wages  would  prevent a major depression  by  keeping  demand 
high.  In  a  White  House  meeting,  Hoover  asked  the  CEOs  of  major 
manufacturing  corporations to not cut their wages.  They agreed to main- 
tain wages,  and  seem  to have  honored  that agreement  during  the first 
two years of the Great Depression-manufacturing  wages  fell only 4.4% 
between  December  1929 and September  1931. [See Lamont  (1930) for a 
description  of the meeting.13] 
13. The effect  of this  intervention,  however,  weakened  during  the  last two  years  of the 
Depression.  By late 1931, Gerard Swope,  CEO of General Electric, circulated an indus- 
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It is  worth  noting  that  there  are  also  manufacturing-wage  surveys 
produced  by the  Bureau of Labor Statistics  (BLS) that could  be used  to 
measure  the distorted  wage,  but these  surveys  do not cover all manufac- 
turing industries,  and they suffer from sampling  problems.  In particular, 
large  firms,  which  tend  to  pay  higher  wages  than  small  firms,  were 
oversampled. 
We now  turn to choosing  the fraction of the economy  distorted  by the 
high  wage.  In our model,  this fraction is governed  by the parameter  a. 
Unfortunately,  we  do not know  of any established  measures  of the frac- 
tion of the economy  distorted  by the high wage.  The data we presented 
earlier  suggest  that  on  average,  manufacturers  paid  high  wages,  but 
farmers  did  not.  But since  we  do  not  have  wage  measures  across  the 
entire  economy  of  the  same  quality  as  the  Conference  Board's  wage 
data, it is difficult to estimate  how  much  of the economy  was  subject to 
high wages.14 
To address  this uncertainty  over the fraction of the economy  distorted 
by the high wage,  we conduct our analysis for two values of the parameter 
a. We first assume  that the entire manufacturing  sector was subject to the 
distorted  wage.  Given Hoover's  view  about the importance  of maintain- 
ing high  wages,  we  also  assume  the  federal  government  paid  the high 
wage.  These  two  sectors  account  for about 28% of employment  in 1929. 
We therefore  choose  a benchmark  value  for a such  that this  sector  ac- 
counts  for 28% of employment  in the deterministic,  flexible-price  steady 
state  of  the  model.  We also  conduct  the  analysis  for a  =  0.50,  which 
implies  that the  distorted  sector  was  50% of the  economy.  This choice 
seems  to be  a plausible  upper  bound  on  the  fraction  of  the  economy 
distorted  by the high wage.  This is because  at least 30% of workers were 
not paid the high wage  (farming and sole proprietors),  and because  there 
do  not  seem  to be  direct  measures  of  wages  of  sufficient  quality  that 
indicate  that half  of  all workers  were  paid  wages  above  trend  values. 
3.2.3  Computing the Equilibrium  Computation  of the equilibrium  of the 
model  with  high  manufacturing  wages  is facilitated  by our assumption 
this plan and refused to recommend it to Congress. Nominal manufacturing  wages 
began to fall significantly  after  Hoover's condemnation  of the Swope plan. 
14. There are wage measures in some nonmanufacturing  sectors, and there are also BLS 
payroll and employment data outside of manufacturing  that can be used to construct 
average employee compensation. A difficulty  with these BLS  payroll data is that the 
coverage  is narrow  in some sectors, the data do not include  hours, and in some sectors 
the data combine all classes of workers, including executives. This last fact suggests 
that constructing  measures  of compensation  per employee from these data  is subject  to 
significant  compositional  bias. We discuss compositional  bias, and how it may have 
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that each wage  shock  is a completely  unexpected,  one-time  event-the 
household  expects  at each  date  that  the  economy  will  return  to  pure 
market  clearing  the  following  period.  This permits  us  to  compute  the 
equilibrium  for each year of the Depression  (1930-1933)  recursively. 
Since households  expect  the economy  to return to market clearing in 
the following  period,  the value  of capital next period  is a function  of the 
single  state variable in the economy,  the aggregate  capital stock. To com- 
pute  the  equilibrium  at date  t when  the manufacturing  wage  is higher 
than its competitive  level,  we use a log-linear approximation  of the right- 
hand  side  of  the  Euler equation  from the  pure  market-clearing  model 
around  its  steady  state.  This  approximation  allows  us  to  estimate  the 
marginal value  of an additional  unit of capital and is used  with the static 
first-order conditions  of the model  to compute  the equilibrium  for each 
year of the Depression.  This involves  solving  N nonlinear equations  in N 
unknowns  for each  year.  We feed  our measures  of the  manufacturing 
wage  for 1930-1933  into the model  and compute  the equilibrium path of 
the  economy  for these  years.  Our  findings  are presented  in  the  next 
section. 
3.3 MACROECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF HIGH  WAGES:  1930-1933 
Tables 7-9  show  the predicted  path of the U.S.  economy  between  1930 
and  1933 for our model  with  benchmark  parameter values  and alterna- 
tive  parameter  values.  We  find  that  the  predicted  depression  for  all 
these  parameter  values  is much  less  severe  than  the  actual U.S.  Great 
Depression. 
Table 7 shows  the equilibrium  path  of output,  consumption,  and in- 
vestment  from our benchmark  model  with  about  28% of the  economy 
distorted  by  the  high  wage.  Predicted  real output  is  about  1% below 
trend in 1930 and about 2% to 3% below  trend between  1931 and 1933. 
Most of the decrease  in economic  activity occurs in the distorted  sector. 
The  high  wage  reduces  employment  in  the  distorted  sector  about  7% 
below  trend.  In contrast,  employment  in  the  nondistorted  sector  falls 
Table  7  PREDICTED  GREAT  DEPRESSION  (1929 = 100), 
BENCHMARK  MODEL 
Year  Y  C  I  hm  h, 
1930  99.2  99.8  96.9  97.8  99.3 
1931  97.3  99.3  90.4  93.1  97.8 
1932  97.2  98.9  91.1  93.3  98.0 
1933  97.8  98.7  94.6  95.4  98.8 200 *  COLE  & OHANIAN 
Table  8  DECOMPOSITION  OF PREDICTED 
OUTPUT:  DIRECT  AND INDIRECT 
EFFECTS,  BENCHMARK  MODEL 
Effect  (%) 
Year  %AY  Direct  Indirect 
1930  -0.8  -1.5  0.7 
1931  -2.7  -6.4  3.7 
1932  -2.8  -6.3  3.5 
1933  -2.2  -4.2  2.0 
Table  9  PREDICTED  GREAT  DEPRESSION:  LARGE  DISTORTED  SECTOR 
(1929 =  100) 
Year  Y  C  I  hm  h, 
1930  98.7  99.7  95.0  97.2  98.9 
1931  95.6  98.9  84.2  91.2  96.4 
1932  95.2  98.2  84.9  91.1  96.5 
1933  96.1  97.8  90.1  93.6  97.8 
only  about  2% to  3% below  trend.  These  predicted  decreases  in  eco- 
nomic  activity are much  smaller than the observed  decreases  in output, 
consumption,  investment,  and employment  that occurred between  1929 
and 1933. 
There are two  reasons  why  predicted  economic  activity  falls so  little 
compared  to the actual decrease  in economic  activity. First, the distorted 
sector is relatively  small,  which  means  that the direct effect of the high 
wage  on aggregate  output is small. Second,  the indirect, general equilib- 
rium effects  tend to reduce,  rather than amplify, the direct effects. 
The most  important  indirect effect is the increase in the relative price 
of manufactured  good,  which  rises 3% to 4% above its steady-state  level 
after 1930. The relative  price rises because  the manufactured  good  is in 
relatively  scarce  supply  and  is  not  highly  substitutable  with  the  non- 
manufactured  good.  This increase  offsets  some  of the distorting  effects 
of the high  manufacturing  wage.  Equation (7) shows  that each percent- 
age-point  increase  in the relative  price of the manufactured  good  effec- 
tively  reduces  the  fixed wage  by one  percentage  point.  Thus,  the 4.4% 
increase  in the  relative  price of manufactured  goods  in 1931 effectively 
reduces  the  manufacturing  wage  from  6.8% above  trend  to just  2.4% 
above trend. 
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direct and indirect  effects.  This decomposition  shows  that the negative 
direct effects are partially offset by the indirect effects. 
The effects of the high wage  depend  on all the model  parameters, but 
in particular depend  on the share parameter  a. We therefore  assess  the 
robustness  of the  results  by increasing  the  distorted  share of the  econ- 
omy  to  50%, which  in  our  view  is  a reasonable  upper  bound  on  the 
distorted  share of the economy. 
Table 9 shows  the equilibrium path of the model economy  with a = 0.5. 
This higher  value  in the model  produces  a larger decrease  in economic 
activity, but the decrease is still much smaller than the actual Great Depres- 
sion. Real output is predicted to be 4.8% below  trend in 1932 with a = 0.5, 
compared to 2.8% below trend in the benchmark version of the model. We 
thus  find that raising the  share of the economy  that must  pay the high 
wage  to 50% does  not materially change  the findings. 
We also conducted  the analysis  by reducing  the elasticity  of substitu- 
tion  between  the  two  sectors  from 0.5 to 0.1.  We do not  present  these 
results,  because  this change  did not significantly  affect the results.  Out- 
put falls about one percentage  point more than in the benchmark model, 
and the  relative  price of the  good  from the  distorted  sector rises more. 
These results suggest  that the high wage was not the primary cause of 
the Great Depression.  Given our measure  of the wage  from the manufac- 
turing  sector,  our benchmark  model  shows  that this wage  accounts  for 
about  a 3% decline  in  output  at the  trough  of  the  Great Depression, 
compared  to an actual 38% decline.  Increasing  the  size  of the distorted 
sector to 50% or reducing  the substitution  elasticity to 0.1 did not signifi- 
cantly change  the results. 
This simple  model  focused  on the basic distorting  effects of an above- 
market wage through two channels-the  direct reduction in sectoral labor 
input, and the general equilibrium effects of the high wage through prices 
to the other sectors of the economy.  One  reason why  the model  doesn't 
generate  a large depression  is that the general  equilibrium  effects offset 
some  of the distortion  of the high  wage.  In particular, the sectoral high 
wage  reduces  output primarily in the distorted sector, and this drives up 
that sector's  relative  price and reduces  the macroeconomic  effect of the 
distortion. 
This  result  raises  the  possibility  that  the  wage  story  might  have  a 
better  chance  if the  theory  could  be  modified  to eliminate  the  relative 
price  increase.  This  approach  is  not  likely  to  be  successful,  however. 
Eliminating  the relative  price increase  arising  from the wage  distortion 
requires substantially  reducing  the demand  for the output  of that sector. 
This reduction  in demand  requires  a second  shock.  In our model,  this 
second  shock  is  a decline  in  the  parameter  a,  which  governs  the  dis- 202 *  COLE  & OHANIAN 
torted sector's  share of aggregate  output.  Reducing  a would  reduce  the 
demand  for  goods  from  the  distorted  sector  and  would  prevent  the 
relative price of the distorted  good  from rising. But this higher real wage 
won't  generate  a  major  depression,  because  the  reduction  in  a  also 
reduces  the  quantitative  importance  of  the  distorted  sector  and  thus 
reduces  the macroeconomic  effect of that sector.15 
Finally, our model  indicates another difficulty with the wage  hypothe- 
sis: the timing  of the depression  and the timing  of wage  increases.  With 
the exception  of 1931, real wage  increases  do not occur at the same  time 
as output  declines.  Real output  fell 13% in 1930, yet the real manufactur- 
ing  wage  remained  close  to trend.  Similarly, real output  fell more than 
17% between  1931  and  1932,  yet  the  real  manufacturing  wage  was 
roughly  unchanged  between  1931 and  1932.  This  lack  of  coincidence 
between  the timing of output  changes  and wage  increases  suggests  that 
some  other shock reduced  output  in those  years. 
Accounting  for the Depression  through  imperfectly  flexible manufac- 
turing wages  is difficult-the  real wage  increase is too small and affects 
too little of the economy,  and wage  increases coincide  with lower  output 
only  in 1931. The hypothesis  would  have  a better chance  if wages  were 
significantly  higher and affected more of the economy,  and if there were 
more  coincidence  between  the  timing  of wage  increases  and  the  Great 
Depression.  But as the next section  describes,  these  factors are unlikely. 
3.4 MEASURED  WAGES  ARE  PROBABLY  BIASED  UPWARDS 
We are skeptical  that actual wages  were  as high  as the  manufacturing- 
wage  measures  suggest.  This is because  the composition  of employees 
changed  during  the  Depression,  and  this  compositional  shift  likely  in- 
duces  upward  bias in the wage  measures.  Researchers  who  analyze  the 
cyclical pattern of real wages  argue that cyclical changes  in the composi- 
tion  of  employment  leads  to  wage  measures  that  are biased  upward 
during  recessions  and biased  downward  during  expansions.  This is be- 
cause  hours  of low-wage  earners tend  to be much  more sensitive  to the 
business  cycle than hours of high-wage  earners. Consequently,  the aver- 
age  employed  worker  during  a  recession  tends  to  be  a  higher-wage 
earner than the average employed  worker during  an expansion. 
Lebergott (1991) and Margo (1993) argue that compositional  effects may 
have been particularly important during the Great Depression.  Lebergott 
argues that compositional  shifts in employee  quality and in the quality of 
operating  establishments  may  result  in  measured  wages  substantially 
15. This discussion  highlights  the problems  associated  with  focusing  on the product  wage 
instead  of the real wage.  In particular, high product wage  results from a combination  of 
a positive  shock to real wages  and a negative  shock to product  demand. Re-examining  the  Contributions  of  Money  and  Banking  Shocks  ?  203 
overstating  actual  wages.  He  indicates  that  layoffs  were  concentrated 
among  low-wage,  young  workers,  which  tends  to increase  the average 
measured  wage  of those  individuals  remaining employed.  He also notes 
that  relatively  young  firms,  rather than  older  established  firms,  failed 
during the Depression,  and that these younger firms tended to pay signifi- 
cantly  lower  wages.  This compositional  change  also  raises  the  average 
measured  wage of those individuals  remaining employed.  Margo makes a 
very similar point regarding compositional  bias.16 
How  large are these  biases?  Lebergott cites some  microeconomic  evi- 
dence  which,  he  argues,  points  to significant  upward  bias arising from 
changes  in employee  quality. He notes  that Westinghouse  and General 
Electric retained  their  most  productive  employees  during  the  Depres- 
sion,  and  also  cut  these  employees'  wages  by  10% between  1929 and 
1931. However,  the  Conference  Board's wage  survey  for this  industry, 
which  was  heavily  influenced  by  these  two  firms,  shows  that  wages 
were  unchanged  during  this period.  This deviation  between  the wages 
paid by these  two firms and the survey  wage  is likely due to changes  in 
the  composition  of  employees  at  the  two  firms.17 While  this  micro- 
economic  example  suggests  the  possibility  of important  compositional 
biases,  we  do not have  the necessary  individual  wage  and employment 
data to measure  aggregate  compositional  effects.  To obtain a rough idea 
of how  compositional  shifts  may  have  affected  measured  wages  more 
broadly, we  compute  estimates  of compositional  bias from the  Current 
Population  Survey  (CPS)  and  the  Panel  Study  of  Income  Dynamics 
(PSID). We estimate  the bias using  two separate computations.  The first 
computation  is  motivated  by  Lebergott's  argument  that  employment 
loss  was  concentrated  among  the  lowest-wage  earners.  Determining 
how  this  compositional  shift  affects  the  wage  requires  specifying  how 
16. There is also evidence that some firms reclassified workers down (e.g.,  a foreman 
works as an assembly-line worker); see Bemanke and Carey (1996) and Lebergott 
(1991).  This would tend to bias wages in the opposite direction  if the individual's  wage 
was unchanged, but the value of the individual's marginal  product fell. It is unclear, 
however, whether reclassified  workers' wages were changed as a consequence  of the 
reclassification. 
17. Lebergott  notes that these two firms laid off low-productivity  workers, reassigned 
some higher-skilled  workers, and assigned the retained  workers to either 2-, 3-, or 4- 
day workweeks, depending on worker  ability,  with the most productive  workers  receiv- 
ing 4-day workweeks. Lebergott  clearly  interprets  these personnel decisions and their 
impact on the measured  wage as an example of upward compositional  wage bias. As 
we noted above, this interpretation  is clearly  warranted  provided  that those reclassified 
employees who performed  different tasks were paid their value marginal  product. If 
these employees were paid in excess of their value marginal  product, however, this 
effect would tend to offset the upward wage bias resulting from the change in the 
composition of employees and the allocation of work towards the most productive 
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employment  loss  was  distributed  during  the  Depression.  To capture 
Lebergott's  argument,  we  assume  that the bottom  20% of wage  earners 
lost  employment  and  that the  remaining  employment  loss  was  evenly 
distributed  across  all other  workers.  Using  CPS data  from  1998 for all 
full-time workers,  we find that the average wage  for the top 80% of wage 
earners  is  about  15% higher  than  for  all full-time  wage  earners.  This 
implies  that the  average  wage  during  the  Great Depression  may  have 
been  overstated  by 15% if the distribution  of employment  loss was  con- 
centrated among low-wage  earners in this fashion,  and if the wage  distri- 
bution  in the 1930s was similar to the wage  distribution  today.18 
Our  second  computation  uses  measures  of  cyclical  compositional 
wage  bias from postwar  data to estimate  the compositional  bias in the 
Depression.  Solon,  Barsky,  and  Parker (1994)  estimate  the  difference 
between  the  response  to  fluctuations  in  output  relative  to  trends  be- 
tween  aggregate  wages  and individual  wages  from the PSID. This differ- 
ence  is a direct measure  of the compositional  bias from using  aggregate 
wages  as a measure  of an average  wage,  and  the bias is an increasing 
function  of  the  magnitude  of  the  decrease  in  output.  Applying  their 
estimates  to  the  Depression  suggests  that  compositional  shifts  biased 
measured  wages  up by about 18%.19 
While we cannot draw a firm conclusion  about the quantitative magni- 
tude of compositional  wage  bias during the Depression,  these  estimates 
suggest  that  measured  wages  may  be  substantially  upward  biased.20 
This  suggests  that  manufacturing  wages  may  have  been  significantly 
below  trend  at the  trough  of  the  Great Depression  after correction  for 
compositional  bias.21 
18. We thank Daniel  Hamermesh  for performing  this computation.  The data are from the 
CPS-ORG 1998. Full-time workers  are defined  as those  working  35 or more hours per 
week. 
19. Solon,  Barsky, and  Parker (1994) only  reported  the  differences  in  the  coefficient  be- 
tween  the  fluctuations  in the  coefficient  on the  unemployment  rate relative  to trend. 
We thank  Jonathon  Parker for computing  their  estimates  using  real chain-weighted 
GDP  rather  than  unemployment.  The  measure  of  the  compositional  bias  is  (0.558- 
0.0896) log[dGDP  (1933)/dGDP (1929)], where  dGDP is the  deviation  of real GDP per 
adult from trend. 
20. It is interesting  to note  that the cross-sectional  differences  in employment  and wages 
between  manufacturing  and farming are consistent  with significant compositional  bias. 
Since the bias should  be most severe for sectors in which  employment  fell substantially, 
we should  observe relatively high wages  associated  with low employment.  Manufactur- 
ing  hours  fell  more  than  40%, and  measured  wages  were  about  5% above  trend.  In 
contrast,  farm hours remained  near trend,  and measured  wages  fell substantially. 
21. Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (BEE, 2000) construct a measure  of hourly  employee  compen- 
sation that rises about 4 percentage  points  more than the Conference  Board's measure 
of  hourly  manufacturing  wages,  and  use  changes  in  this  measure  as  a  proxy  for 
changes  in the average wage  during the Great Depression.  There are two reasons  why 
the change  in their average  compensation  measure  may deviate  considerably  from the Re-examining  the  Contributions  of Money  and  Banking  Shocks  ?  205 
4.  How  Much  of the  Great  Depression  Was  Due 
to Banking  Shocks? 
This  section  asks  how  much  banking  shocks  contributed  to  the  Great 
Depression.  Unfortunately,  there is no standard version  of the neoclassi- 
cal growth  model  with  financial intermediation  to use  for this purpose, 
nor is there a standard  definition  of the banking  shock-at  least not as 
an explicit shock to primitives  (technologies  or endowments)  that can be 
used  in  a  general  equilibrium  model.  We  therefore  develop  a simple 
benchmark  neoclassical  model  in which  banking  output,  which  is pro- 
duced  with deposits  and information  capital, is an input into production 
of the economy's  final good.  We define the banking shock to be the stock 
of information capital lost as a consequence  of bank closings.  This defini- 
tion is consistent  with  the literature which  associates  the banking  shock 
with bank failures and the destruction  of information  capital. We use the 
model  to address  three questions:  How  much  did bank closings  reduce 
intermediation  capital? How  much did this loss of intermediation  capital 
reduce  output? Are the predicted  effects of bank closings  on other vari- 
ables consistent  with  the data? 
4.1 A MODEL  WITH  FINANCIAL  INTERMEDIATION 
Our model  extends  the standard neoclassical  growth model by requiring 
that some  investment  be intermediated.  This modifies  the standard model 
to  include  both  internally  and  externally  financed  investment.  In our 
model,  a fraction of the capital stock is transferred from households  to 
firms  by  an  intermediation  technology  that  uses  real  resources.  This 
technology  gives  rise to borrowing  and lending  rates. The model  allows 
us to analyze  the effects  of shocks  to the intermediation  technology  on 
output,  intermediated  and internally  financed  investment,  and borrow- 
ing and lending  rates. 
change  in the average person's  wage  during the Depression.  First, as we noted  before, 
it is difficult  to infer individual wage  changes  from an aggregated  compensation  mea- 
sure because  of compositional  shifts  in employment.  Thus,  their compensation  mea- 
sure  is  also  subject  to  upward  bias  under  the  assumption  that layoffs  were  concen- 
trated among low-wage  earners. Second,  there is an inconsistency  in their construction 
of total hours  worked  which  is used  in measuring  average  hourly  compensation.  In 
particular,  their  measure  of  total  hours  worked  is  equal  to  the  number  of  full-time 
equivalent  employees  (from the NIPA) multiplied  by Kendrick's  (1961) average hours 
worked  for full-time  equivalent  workers,  which  includes  not only employees,  but also 
proprietors  and  unpaid  family  workers.  These  latter  two  groups  are  quantitatively 
important, accounting  for about 38% of Kendrick's full-time equivalent  workers in 1929 
(see  p.  304).  For BEE's calculation,  this  measure  of  hours  would  be  correct  only  if 
fluctuations  in  proprietor  and  unpaid  family  hours  were  identical  to  fluctuations  in 
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We now  describe  the model  in detail.  There are two  plants  that pro- 
duce a single physical  good  using  capital. At the beginning  of the period 
there  are  three  types  of  capital:  installed physical capital at each  plant, 
which  we  denote  by  K1 and  K2, respectively;  uninstalled physical capital, 
which  is  held  by  households  and  is  denoted  by  D; and  intermediation 
capital, which  we  denote  by Z. Intermediation  capital is in fixed supply. 
The  capital  stocks  at each  plant  can be  increased  during  the  period 
with  uninstalled  capital.  We denote  by  x,  and  x2 the  amounts  that are 
installed  during  the period.  This uninstalled  capital must  be intermedi- 
ated,  and  some  of  this  capital  is  used  up  during  the  intermediation 
process.  The capital available for production  is thus Kj + xj. At the end of 
each period,  some  output  is used  to costlessly  augment  the capital stock 
at each plant,  and the remainder is distributed  to households  who  either 
consume  it or hold  it as uninstalled  capital for the following  period. 
The plant technologies  are subject to an i.i.d.  shock,  which  is realized 
at the beginning  of each period.  The production  shock  can take on two 
levels:  Eh and  el, where  Eh  >  El  >  0. One plant receives  the high  shock  Eh, 
and one plant receives  the low shock el. Each plant has an equal probabil- 
ity of receiving  the high productivity  level,  and we normalize  the shocks 
so that 0.5(Eh  +  E1)  =  1. 
After  the  idiosyncratic  plant  productivity  shock  has  been  realized, 
uninstalled  capital is allocated  to the two production  plants according  to 
2 
Exj  < G(D, Z). 
j=l1 
We will assume  that G exhibits  constant  returns to scale  (CRS) and that 
G(D,Z)  -  D.  The resources  used  in the  intermediation  process  are the 
quantity D -  G(D,Z). 
Plant output  is produced  from a CRS Cobb-Douglas  technology  that 
uses  capital and  labor. For simplicity,  we  assume  that there is one  unit 
of labor at each plant,  and  that labor is in fixed supply.  Plant output  is 
given  by 
y=  = Aej(Kj  +  x))Y 
Plant  output  is  used  for either  consumption  or investment.  Invest- 
ment  from  retained  output  has  no  intermediation  cost.  The  resource 
constraint  for this economy  is 
E  Ae-(K  +x  x)-KJ?  c+D', 
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where  D' denotes  the next period's  level of uninstalled  capital and Kjthe 
amount  of capital installed  at plant i at the beginning  of the next period. 
We require that output  net of retained investment  be nonnegative. 
The social planning  problem for this economy  is given  by 
0 
Pl:  {max  I  tu(ct)  (8)  P1: 
C,Xi, t  i,  t+l,Dt+l  I  t(8 
subject to 
G(Dt,,Z)  '  xj,t,  (9) 
>[AEt,(Kt,j  +  xt,j)  -  Kt+l,j]  ct +  Dt+l,  (10) 
AEjt(Kjt  +  xjt)y 
-  K;t '  0  for each  j =  1, 2 and  t,  (11) 
jt  -  0  for each  j  =  1, 2 and  t.  (12) 
We assume  that the difference  in the Eh  and El  is small enough  that the 
nonnegativity  constraint  on  retained  earnings  given  in  equation  (11) 
never  binds.  Since the productivity  shocks  are i.i.d.,  it is optimal  to set 
K1 =  K2 =  K/2  Thus,  we  aggregate  plant  capital  and  define  the  state 
variables to be (K, D). 
The solution to this planning problem can be decentralized  as a competi- 
tive equilibrium.  This allows  us to solve  for equilibrium  borrowing  and 
lending  rates.  We assume  competitive  profit-maximizing  firms operate 
each plant. We also assume  that there is a competitive  profit-maximizing 
intermediary  who  operates  the  intermediation  technology.  This  inter- 
mediary receives  funds from the household  at the savings  rate 1 + rs  and 
loans it out at the borrowing  rate 1 +  rb. 
In equilibrium,  the marginal cost of additional  capital to the high pro- 
ductivity  plant,  1 +  rb, must be equal to its marginal productivity: 
/K  \ 
1 +  rb =  yAEh  2  +G(Dt,  Z) 
Similarly, the interest rate on savings  must be just equal to the return on 
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1 +  rs =  YAEh  2  +G(Dt,  Z))  GD(Dt,Z). 
The spread  between  these  two rates is 
rb  -  rs =  yA Eh  (2  +G(D(  D,  Z)  D , Z). 
Note  that  this  spread  is  a decreasing  function  of  the  level  of  inter- 
mediation  capital, Z. Thus, a decrease in Z will raise the spread between 
these  two  rates.  It can also  be  shown  that a decrease  in  Z will  reduce 
output  and  the  quantity  of intermediated  capital,  but will  increase  the 
quantity  of  internally  financed  capital  as  firms  substitute  out  of  in- 
termediation  into  internal  finance.  These  results  are presented  in  the 
Appendix. 
4.2 HOW MUCH  DID BANK  CLOSINGS  REDUCE 
INTERMEDIATION  CAPITAL? 
Our  model  provides  a measure  of  the  banking  shock-the  loss  of  in- 
termediation  capital as a consequence  of bank closings.  Assuming  that 
intermediation  capital is in fixed supply  and is bank-specific,  the fraction 
of intermediation  capital lost due to bank closings  is equal to the fraction 
of  deposits  in  suspended  or failed  banks.  This implication  follows  di- 
rectly from the CRS intermediation  technology.  We therefore infer from 
the  deposit  data presented  in  Table 6 that bank  closings  cumulatively 
reduced  intermediation  capital  about  8% between  1930 and  1932, and 
about 19% between  1930 and 1933. 
4.3 HOW MUCH  DID THE  BANKING  SHOCK  REDUCE  OUTPUT? 
We now  use  our model  to evaluate  the contribution  of this decrease  in 
intermediation  capital to the Depression.  Fixing (Kt, Dr), the elasticity  of 
output  with  respect to intermediation  capital is given by 
dYt Z,  AEh[K,/2 +  G(Dt,  Zt)]'-lyGz(Dt,  Z,)Z, 
dZ, Y,  Yt 
The numerator of the right-hand side is the total return to intermediation. 
Therefore, the left-hand side of this equation is the intermediation  sector's 
share of value added.  This value-added-share  elasticity result is not spe- 
cific to our model.  In fact, any model with a CRS technology  for producing 
final goods  has the feature that, to a first-order approximation,  the elastic- 
ity of the final good with respect to any intermediate  good is equal to that 
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Banking's share of value added  was about 1% in the 1930s. In fact, the 
value-added  share of an entire finance,  insurance,  and real estate  (FIRE) 
sector was  only  about 13% in 1929, and dropped  to 11% in 1933.22  Note 
that this value-added  measure actually overstates  the elasticity, since our 
model  attributes all of banking's  value  added  to intermediation  capital. 
Some of this sector's value added will be paid to labor, which  means that 
the elasticity  of output  with  respect to intermediation  capital is actually 
lower than the share of value added.  With this small elasticity, our model 
predicts  that the decrease  in intermediation  capital caused by bank clos- 
ings reduced  output  less than 1% between  1929 and 1933. 
4.3.1  Can a Low Substitution Elasticity Plausibly Magnify the Shock?  The 
macroeconomic  effect  of  destroyed  intermediation  capital  would  be 
larger if bank  finance  and  alternative  forms  of finance  or other  inputs 
were poor substitutes.  A low substitution  elasticity, however,  is inconsis- 
tent  with  the  data.  If banking  shocks  were  an  important  contributing 
factor to the Depression  and this substitution  elasticity was very low, the 
cost  share  of banking  and  of FIRE should  have  increased  considerably 
during  the  1930s.  In contrast,  the  cost  share  of FIRE falls from 13% in 
1929 to 11% in 1933, and banking's  cost  share falls from about  1.4% to 
about 1% over the same period.23 
4.3.2  Can Externalities  Magnify the Impact  of the Shock?  Evidence  from State- 
Level Data  An externality  associated  with  intermediation  capital could 
increase the economic  impact of an intermediation  shock. One drawback 
to the externality  story is that there are many  different  ways  of putting 
externalities into models,  but often these externalities  do not have strong 
micro  foundations,  nor  are they  straightforward  to  evaluate  quantita- 
tively.  The banking/depression  literature,  however,  suggests  a specific 
type of externality that is straightforward  to assess.  This literature argues 
that bank failures reduced  output  by destroying  local bank information, 
and  thus  suggests  a productive  externality  associated  with  intermedia- 
tion capital that affects local production.  We therefore consider  a version 
of our model  in which  there are N regions,  and aggregate  output  is the 
sum  of regional outputs. 
Suppose  that output  in region  i is given by 
2 
Yi =  Zi  Aet,j(Kt, j +  x,ij)YH- 
j=l 
22. Banking  accounted  for 10% of value  added  in FIRE in  1947. Kuznets  (1941) reports a 
similar  number  for the period 1919-1938. 
23. The data on banking's  cost share are from Kuznets (1941,  p. 731). 210 *  COLE  & OHANIAN 
Figure 1 PERSONAL  INCOME  VS. SUSPENSIONS  BY  STATE  DURING  THE 
DEPRESSION 
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Where  Z4  is  the  productive  externality  from  intermediation  capital  in 
region  i. This version  of our model  predicts  that regions  that experience 
many bank closings  should  also experience  relatively  large depressions. 
We assess  this  prediction  by  first defining  a region  as a state and  then 
computing  the  correlation  between  bank  suspensions  or  failures  and 
economic  activity across the 48 U.S.  states during the Great Depression. 
Note  that this  comparison  is a regional  extension  of Bernanke's  (1983) 
influential  paper, which  found  that aggregate  bank suspensions  and fail- 
ures were negatively  correlated with aggregate  output. 
Figure 1 shows  a scatterplot of the sum of suspended  and failed depos- 
its from 1929 to 1933 relative to total deposits  in 1929 vs.  the percentage 
change  in nominal  personal  income between  1929 and 1933 by state. The 
most striking feature of these data is that the significant negative  correla- 
tion between  bank closings  and output  documented  by Bernanke (1983) 
at the aggregate level does not emerge  at the state level.24 The plot shows 
no systematic  relationship  between  the concentration  of banking  shocks 
and the severity  of the Depression  across states.  The correlation between 
suspended  deposits  and nominal  income is -0.15  and is not significantly 
different  from zero.  A regression  of the percentage  change  in personal 
income  divided  by the aggregate  GDP deflator on the fraction of depos- 
its  in  suspended  and  failed  banks  yields  an  R2 of  0.014  and  a  slope 
24. Temin  (1989) also  notes  that  some  bank-failure  episodes  were  very  regionally  con- 
centrated. 
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Figure 2 MANUFACTURING WORKERS VS. BANK SUSPENSIONS  BY STATE 
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coefficient  that is not  significantly  different  from zero.25 We also exam- 
ined  the  relationship  between  the  same  measure  of  deposits  and  an 
alternative  statewide  measure  of real economic  activity-the  percentage 
change in manufacturing  employment  between  1929 and 1933.26  Figure 2 
shows  a  scatterplot  between  these  two  variables.  The  correlation  be- 
tween  these  data is, in fact, positive  rather than negative:  0.12.27 
These  data  do not  support  the  standard  banking  story  for the  Great 
Depression:  that bank closings  reduced  output by destroying  local infor- 
mation  capital.  The  relatively  small  bank  shock,  combined  with  bank- 
ing's small share in the production  function,  and the lack of any correla- 
tion  between  state-level  bank  closings  and  economic  activity  indicate 
that if banking  was  an important  contributing  factor during  the  Great 
Depression,  it must have operated  through some  alternative mechanism 
in which  the shock was  much larger and was  operative  at the aggregate 
25. We  estimated  two  other  versions  of  this  equation.  To control  for  level  affects,  we 
defined  a dummy  variable that takes the value  of 1 if a state's per capita income  was 
above  the median.  We used  this  dummy  variable to analyze  (1) an intercept  shift and 
(2) an intercept shift and a slope coefficient  shift. The results were quite similar to those 
for the simpler  specification. 
26. These  data are from the biannual  Census  of Manufacturers. 
27. The lack of a systematic  pattern  between  bank  closings  and  economic  activity  at the 
state level raises the possibility  that the correlation between  aggregate bank closing  and 
aggregate  output  may  indicate  that aggregate  bank closings  are proxying  for another 
variable. This is consistent  with  Green and Whiteman  (1992). 212 *  COLE  & OHANIAN 
level  rather than  the  regional  level.  We analyze  an  alternative  mecha- 
nism in the following  section. 
4.4 OTHER  SHOCKS  TO BANK  CAPACITY 
An alternative banking  story is that depositors  were  afraid of bank runs 
and  consequently  withdrew  deposits  from  all banks.  This  alternative 
story would  have  a better  chance  than  the bank-failure  story if the  de- 
crease in deposits  resulting  from depositor  fear was  substantially  larger 
than  the  decrease  in deposits  at closed  banks.  This story is difficult  to 
evaluate,  however,  because  it is  unclear  how  much  of the  decrease  in 
total deposits  was  due to depositor  fear and how  much was  an endoge- 
nous  response  to the large decrease  in overall economic  activity. Conse- 
quently,  we  can't measure  the size of this shock associated  with  deposi- 
tor fear. 
Despite  this  measurement  problem,  our  model  makes  one  specific 
prediction  about this story that can be evaluated.  According  to this story, 
banking  services  are in relatively  scarce supply  because  of deposit  with- 
drawal.  The model  predicts  that an exogenous  decrease  in deposits  will 
decrease  the  deposit/output  ratio.  This  result  is  not  specific  to  our 
model,  but  follows  directly  from  CRS in  production  and  the  relative 
scarcity  of  deposits.  The  actual  deposit/output  ratio,  however,  differs 
considerably  from this prediction.  Table 6 shows  that the ratio rises from 
0.58 to 0.78 between  1929 and  1932. This increase  implies  that deposits 
were not relatively  scarce during the Great Depression. 
Even if deposits  were  relatively scarce because  of depositor  fear, how- 
ever,  there  is  no  theoretical  presumption  that  this  would  generate  a 
massive  depression,  because  banking's  share of value  added  is small.  In 
fact,  these  cost-share  statistics  suggest  a  presumption  that  banking 
shocks  should  tend  to  have  small,  rather  than  large,  macroeconomic 
effects.  The Irish bank strikes of the 1960-1970s  provide  evidence  that is 
consistent  with  this  latter view.  Murphy  (1978) reports  that  on  three 
occasions  between  1966 and  1976,  industrial  disputes  led  to  the  shut- 
down  of the  Associated  Banks,  which  accounted  for over  80% of Irish 
M2. These strikes, the longest  of which  was six months,  represent nega- 
tive,  exogenous  shocks  to  the  banking  sector  that  are larger than  any 
plausible  bank capacity shock that might  have  occurred during  the U.S. 
Great Depression.  The macroeconomic  effects of these  strikes, however, 
were  small.  During  the  longest  strike,  detrended  retail sales  fell about 
4%, and  real output  rose  over  the  full  calendar  year  of  1970. Murphy 
argues that the strike did not have important effects because  households 
and  firms  developed  substitutes  for  bank  services,  including  private 
trade credit.  These  "natural experiments"  show  that a long-term  shut- Re-examining  the  Contributions  of  Money  and  Banking  Shocks  ?  213 
down  of most  of a country's  banking  system-a  shutdown  much  larger 
than that which  occurred  during  the Great Depression-need  not  sub- 
stantially reduce economic  activity. 
These  data  are inconsistent  with  the  view  that  the  Depression  was 
caused  by  a  large  exogenous  decrease  in  deposits.  Instead,  they  are 
consistent  with  the  view  that the  decrease  in  deposits  may  have  been 
primarily  an  endogenous  response  to  the  overall  decline  in  economic 
activity. 
4.5 OTHER  IMPLICATIONS  OF A BANKING  SHOCK 
Our analyses  of the banking  story-through  an explicit shock based  on 
bank closings  and  through  an alternative  story based  on  a decrease  in 
overall  bank  capacity-do  not  support  the  view  that banking  was  an 
important  contributing  factor to  the  Great Depression.  Of course,  any 
explicit  analysis  along these  lines  depends  on a definition  and measure 
of the  banking  shock.  Some  other  aspects  of the banking  story  can be 
assessed  without  an explicit  definition  and measure  of this shock.  Our 
model makes two such predictions.  The first prediction  is that any reduc- 
tion in banking capacity should  increase the spread between  deposit  and 
loan interest rates. The second  is that any reduction  in the availability of 
intermediated  loans,  or any increase  in the cost of intermediated  loans, 
should  lead  firms to substitute  out of external finance  and into internal 
finance. 
4.5.1  Impact  of the Banking Shock  on the Cost of Intermediation  Our model 
predicts  that a negative  shock to the banking  sector increases the spread 
between  the  interest  rate on intermediated  debt  and the bank's  cost of 
funds.  Before examining  changes  in interest  spreads,  it is important  to 
recognize  that  these  spreads  are  affected  not  just  by  intermediation 
shocks,  but also by changes  in loan maturity, changes  in the composition 
of borrowers,  and changes  in default risk. Since these  other factors may 
have  changed  significantly  during  the Great Depression,  it is very diffi- 
cult  to  separately  identify  changes  in  interest  spreads  that  are due  to 
changes  in the intermediation  technology. 
This  identification  problem  leads  us  to  make  two  comparisons  of 
interest-rate spreads.  We first examine  an interest-rate spread between  a 
collateralized,  short-term  obligation  and  short-term  Treasuries  during 
the Great Depression.  This comparison  permits us to reasonably  control 
for some  of the  other  factors  affecting  interest  spreads:  both  securities 
have  roughly  constant  maturities,  and  the  collateralized  nature  of  the 
private obligation  limits the effect of changes  in either default probability 
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Our  second  comparison  presents  the  spread  between  long-term, 
quality-rated  corporate  securities  and  government  bonds  during  the 
Great  Depression.  This  analysis  has  been  conducted  in  the  previous 
literature  for low-quality  corporate  debt.  However,  the  change  in  this 
low-quality  spread cannot be solely  attributed to intermediation  shocks, 
because  the default  risk on these  lower-quality  securities  increased  dur- 
ing the Great Depression.  Consequently,  it is unclear how  much  of the 
change in the spread was due to intermediation,  and how  much was due 
to higher  default  risk. To confront  this identification  problem,  we  pres- 
ent spreads  on high-quality  securities  whose  default  risk may not have 
changed  much  during  the  Depression.  If  a  negative  intermediation 
shock  was  important,  spreads  on  all types  of  securities  would  be  ex- 
pected  to  rise  in  the  1930s.  Alternatively,  if the  spread  on  low-quality 
debt  was  higher  largely  because  of changes  in default  risk, the  spread 
should  be  roughly  unchanged  for  the  highest-quality  securities,  but 
should  rise for lower-quality  securities. 
We first analyze  our measure  of the short-term  spread.  Table 10 pre- 
sents  the spread between  3- to 6-month banker's acceptances  and 3- to 6- 
month  Treasury  notes.  The  banker's  acceptances  are  collateralized, 
which  controls  for changes  in default risk. Since the bank that originally 
discounted  the bill stood  as the guarantor of its ultimate  payment,  it is 
important  to note  that the bank performed  an important  intermediation 
function  in the production  of this asset.  Consequently,  a negative  shock 
to the intermediation  technology  should  have  increased  the  spread  be- 
tween  these  two securities.  The table shows  that the spread between  the 
rate on banker's acceptances  and Treasuries does  not change  much dur- 
ing  the  Depression.  The  stability  of  this  interest-rate  spread  therefore 
Table 10  BANKER'S  ACCEPTANCE  RATES  AND GOVERNMENT 
SECURITY YIELDSa 
Interest  rate  (%/yr) 
(1)  (2) 
Banker's  Short-term 
Year  acceptances  govt. debt  (1) -  (2) 
1928  4.09  3.97  0.12 
1929  5.03  4.42  0.61 
1930  2.48  2.23  0.25 
1931  1.57  1.15  0.42 
1932  1.28  0.78  0.50 
1933  0.63  0.26  0.37 
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Table  11  INTEREST-RATE  SPREADS  BETWEEN  CORPORATE  AND 
GOVERNMENT  BONDSa 
Spread  (%/yr) 
Year  Aaa -  Gov  Aa -  Gov  A -  Gov  Baa -  Gov 
1929  1.13  1.33  1.68  2.30 
1930  1.26  1.48  1.84  2.61 
1931  1.24  1.71  2.67  4.28 
1932  1.33  2.30  3.52  5.62 
1933  1.18  1.92  2.78  4.45 
Avg.  1.25  1.85  2.70  4.24 
aThe  data are from  Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System (1943). 
indicates  that the  efficiency  of this  type  of intermediation  was  not  im- 
paired during the Depression.28 
We next  examine  the  spread  between  the  rates on  corporate  bonds, 
which  are a substitute  for bank finance for large firms, and U.S.  govern- 
ment bonds.  Table 11 shows  the spread  for corporate bonds  of different 
qualities-Aaa  (lowest  default risk), Aa, A, and Baa. There are two strik- 
ing features of these data. First, the average increase in interest spreads is 
fairly small.  Second,  the magnitude  of the increases  in the spread is di- 
rectly related to the quality of the debt: the average spread changes  very 
little for high-quality  debt, but increases  for lower-quality  debt. 
These  data are consistent  with  the view  that changes  in default  risk 
were  an  important  contributing  factor to  higher  spreads.  To illustrate 
how  these changes  could have affected spreads,  suppose  that Baa securi- 
ties pay  off 60% of the principal if the firm defaults.  With this assump- 
tion,  the  230-basis-point  spread  between  Treasuries  and  Baa bonds  in 
1929 implies  that the default  probability for Baa bonds  was  about 5% at 
that  time.  It also  implies  that  the  average  424-basis-point  Baa spread 
during the Depression  can be completely  explained  by an increase in this 
default probability from 5% to 8%. This increase does not seem implausi- 
ble during this period.29 
While we cannot draw a firm conclusion  about the quantitative impor- 
28. The  gap  between  commercial  loan  rates  and  short-term  government  securities  rose 
about 250 basis points  during  the Depression.  The gap between  commercial  loans and 
government  bonds,  however,  narrowed  by about  120 basis  points.  Given  the caveats 
mentioned  above,  plus  a steepening  in the yield  curve,  it is not clear how  to interpret 
these  changes. 
29. Cole and Ohanian  (2000) present  a monthly  analysis  of those  spreads,  which  permits a 
closer examination  of changes  in spreads  with  the onset  of banking  crises.  We did not 
find much evidence  of large increases  in interest spreads  around these  periods. 216 *  COLE  & OHANIAN 
Figure  3 DOMESTIC  INDUSTRIES:  PROFITS,  DIVIDENDS,  AND RETAINED 
EARNINGS  (WITHOUT  IVA) 
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tance of changes  in default  risk, it is certainly true that default risk rose 
during  the  Depression  and  thus  contributed  to  higher  spreads.  But 
even  if  we  abstract  from  default  risk  and  completely  attribute  these 
higher  spreads  to  negative  intermediation  shocks,  it  seems  unlikely 
that  these  increases-ranging  from  12 to  194 basis  points-can  plausi- 
bly  explain  the  Great  Depression.  If higher  spreads  were  the  key  to 
understanding  the Great Depression,  they  should  have  increased  much 
more  during  the  Depression  than  during  milder  recessions.  But this  is 
not  the  case.  The average  rise in the  Baa-Treasury  spread  for all post- 
World War II recessions  is  more  than  200 basis  points.  This  includes 
several  recessions  in  the  1970s  and  early  1980s  in  which  this  spread 
rose  as  much  as  500 basis  points.  All  of  these  recessions  were  much 
milder  than  the  Great Depression,  despite  these  much  larger interest- 
spread increases. 
In summary,  interest spreads  did not rise much outside  of low-quality 
corporate securities,  and it is unclear how  much of this increase is due to 
intermediation  shocks.  Moreover,  the average  increase  in spreads  does 
not seem  to be nearly large enough  to account for the magnitude  of the 
Great Depression.  In the following  section, we present the second predic- 
tion  of  our  model  that  does  not  rely  on  an  explicit  definition  of  the 
banking  shock.  Our model  shows  that  if a negative  banking  shock  in- 
creased  the cost of funds  and disrupted  economic  activity, firms should 
have increased  retained  earnings. Re-examining  the Contributions  of Money and Banking  Shocks  *  217 
Figure 4 MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES: PROFITS, DIVIDENDS, AND 
RETAINED EARNINGS (WITHOUT IVA) 
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4.5.2  Impact of Banking Shocks on Other Sources of Finance  The  theory 
predicts  that a reduction  in the availability of intermediated  finance,  or 
an  increase  in  the  cost  of  intermediated  finance,  should  lead  firms  to 
substitute  out  of intermediated  finance  and increase  retained  earnings. 
Figures 3 and 4 show  real profits,  dividends,  and retained  earnings  per 
adult relative to trend in the entire corporate sector and in the manufac- 
turing subsector,  respectively.  The most  striking feature of these  data is 
that firms were  not increasing  retained  earnings  as the theory  predicts. 
In  sharp  contrast,  retained  earnings  fell  substantially  as  firms  main- 
tained  high  dividend  payments.  Corporate  profits  fell  by  nearly  40% 
between  1929 and  1930, but dividend  payments  fell by only  about 4%. 
Profits  decreased  by  over  70% between  1929 and  1931,  but  dividend 
payments  fell  by  only  25% during  that  period.  By  1932,  corporations 
experienced  substantial  losses,  but retained  earnings  fell even  more  as 
firms maintained  dividend  payments  equal  to 51% of their  1929 level. 
This pattern also emerges  at the sectoral level.  Figure 4 shows  that a very 
similar pattern prevailed  among  manufacturing  corporations,  and Table 
12 shows  that  this  pattern  continues  among  durable  and  nondurable 
manufacturers  and among  mining  corporations.30 
30. There  was  some  variation  in  dividend  payouts  at the  industry  level.  For example, 
dividends  in the tobacco industry  were particularly high during the Depression.  These 
outliers did not affect the sectoral-level  statistics much.  Real nondurable  manufacturing 
dividends  in 1933 were  66% of their 1929 level.  Excluding  tobacco,  these  dividends  in 
1933 were 62% of their 1929 level. 218 *  COLE  & OHANIAN 
Table 12  PROFITS  AND DIVIDENDS  IN KEY  SECTORSa 
Mining  Durable  Mfg.  Nondurable  Mfg. 
Year  Profits  Divs.  Profits  Divs.  Profits  Divs. 
1929  430  309  2247  1335  2332  1213 
1931  -75  118  -155  811  1303  1133 
1933  -115  66  -721  314  -85  803 
aThe  data are from NIPA and are measured  without inventory  valuation  adjustment.  They are in real 
dollars  per adult, and are detrended  at the average  rate  of growth of output  per adult:  1.9%.  We thank 
Mark  Gertler  for suggesting this measure  of cash flow (net of depreciation). 
The  maintenance  of  dividend  payments  at  the  expense  of  retained 
earnings  throughout  the  Depression  suggests  that firms were  liquidat- 
ing  their enterprises,  rather than  finding  substitutes  for costly  bank  fi- 
nance.  Reconciling  this large drop in retained earnings with  the banking 
story  seems  difficult.  To do  so  requires  explaining  why  firms  drained 
their coffers  and  increased  their exposure  to negative  banking  shocks. 
5.  Interactions  between  the  Wage  and  Banking  Shocks 
Even  though  we  find  that neither  banking  shocks  nor wage  shocks  ac- 
count for much of the Great Depression,  is it possible  that the interaction 
between  these  two  shocks  has  a large macroeconomic  effect? There are 
two  reasons  why  we  do  not  think  this  is  very  likely.  If there  was  an 
important  connection  between  the  two  types  of shocks,  we  should  ob- 
serve  a strong  negative  correlation  between  the  incidence  of banking 
crises and economic  activity in sectors distorted by high wages.  Manufac- 
turing  was  ostensibly  distorted  by  the  high  wage,  but  the  correlation 
between  manufacturing  employment  and bank closings  was  positive  at 
the state level,  rather than negative.  Moreover,  the correlation between 
state per capita income and bank failures in states with large manufactur- 
ing sectors-those  with  above-median  ratios of manufacturing  employ- 
ment to population-is  roughly  the same as that for all the states,  and is 
not significantly  different from zero. 
There are also theoretical  reasons  for doubting  that an interaction be- 
tween  the two  shocks  would  have  large effects.  To illustrate this point, 
consider  the  simplest  possible  method  of  incorporating  the  banking 
shock  into  the  wage  model.  Suppose  that  intermediation  capital  is an- 
other input into production,  and denote  the sectoral level of intermedia- 
tion capital by Zi. Sectoral output  is now  given  by the production  func- 
tion  Y, =  (AH)l-"'Y-Z7,  where  0 is unchanged  and  y  =  0.01  to match 
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forward to show  that the 18% decrease  in Z that occurred between  1929 
and  1933 would  reduce  output  in the wage  model  an additional  0.18%. 
This result partially reflects the fact that the  decrease  in intermediation 
capital leads  to general equilibrium  changes  in factor prices that moder- 
ate the impact of the factor change. 
6.  What  Else  was Different  about  the  Great  Depression? 
The two candidate  shocks we have considered-bank  failures and imper- 
fectly  flexible  wages-don't  seem  capable  of  plausibly  explaining  the 
Great Depression.  So if it wasn't  banking  or wages,  what  other factors 
might  have been  responsible?31 
6.1 LOWER  ASSET  PRICES 
The first alternative  shock  we  examine  is lower  asset  prices.  The stock- 
market crash of 1929 is considered  by some  economists  to have  contrib- 
uted  to the Great Depression  (see Romer, 1993). It is difficult to evaluate 
this story, since  there currently  is no generally  accepted  theory  of asset 
price fluctuations.  Without  such a theory, one cannot establish  that asset 
price changes  contributed  significantly  to the Great Depression.32 But we 
can take  a first step  by  empirically  assessing  whether  other  periods  of 
large and  prolonged  decreases  in asset  prices  also  coincide  with  major 
depressions.  One  of  the  best  known  of these  episodes  is Japan in the 
1990s. We therefore  compare  changes  in stock prices  and output  in the 
U.S.  in  the  1930s with  Japan in the  1990s.  Tables 13 and  14 show  real 
stock prices and output  for these  two countries.  We find some  important 
similarities  in asset  price changes  between  the  two  countries,  but very 
different  output  changes  after share prices fall. 
Stock prices  in both  countries  roughly  doubled  during  the three-year 
period  before  their respective  market peaks.  Output  growth  relative to 
respective  trends  is also  very  similar in the  two  countries  during  these 
three-year periods  of rising stock prices.  Following  their respective  mar- 
ket peaks,  stock prices  fell sharply  in both  countries.  U.S.  share prices 
fell about 68%, and Japanese share prices  fell about 55%. Despite  these 
similar  stock  price  patterns,  output  growth  differs  substantially  after 
31. One difference  between these two episodes is that the deflation  of 1921-1922  immedi- 
ately followed a significant inflation, whereas that 1929-1933 followed a period of 
roughly stable  prices. If nominal prices  were more flexible  during  the early  Depression, 
the deflation may have had smaller real effects. Little is known, however, about the 
differences  in price flexibility  during  these two downturns. 
32. Without  a good theory of asset price fluctuations,  it is unclear  what shock drove down 
asset prices,  or how asset prices  interacted  with employment,  consumption,  and invest- 
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Table 13  REAL U.S.  DETRENDED STOCK 
PRICES AND  OUTPUT 
(1929 =  100) 
Year  S&P  indexa  Output  index 
1926  50.4  102.8 
1927  61.7  100.1 
1928  78.2  97.7 
1929  100.0  100.0 
1930  81.4  86.9 
1931  57.1  77.6 
1932  31.6  64.0 
aSource:  Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  Sys- 
tem (1943,  Table  X, pp. 492-498). 
Table 14  REAL JAPANESE DETRENDED 
STOCK PRICES AND  OUTPUTa 
(1989 =  100) 
Year  Nikkei  index  Output  index 
1986  55.1  96.2 
1989  100.0  100.0 
1990  81.6  101.4 
1991  63.1  101.5 
1992  44.6  98.9 
aQuantities  are not per adult. They have been detrended 
using a 3.7% growth rate, which is the average for real 
output  between 1979  and 1989.  Data  are  from  the DRI  Inter- 
national  Database. 
prices begin  to fall. U.S.  output  is 36% below  trend three years after its 
stock-market  peak,  whereas  Japanese  output  remains  on  trend  three 
years after its stock-market peak.33 
These data show  that large asset price decreases  are not always  associ- 
ated with  big depressions.  Japanese  stock prices  fell nearly  as much  in 
the  1990s  as  U.S.  share  prices  fell  in  the  1930s,  but  Japanese  output 
remained  close to trend while  stock prices fell.34  These Japanese data and 
33. Japan did experience  a growth slowdown  after 1991, and by 1998 was  15% below  trend. 
However,  note  that this decrease  comes  9 years after the decrease  in asset prices. 
34. Land values  in Japan also followed  the same roller-coaster pattern as stock prices in the 
1990s. Commercial real estate values  doubled  during the same period that stock prices 
doubled,  and fell 35% three years after the market peak.  These  data are thus inconsis- 
tent with  the  view  that Japan maintained  high  macroeconomic  activity because  other 
asset  values  remained  high.  (See commercial  real estate  prices  in the six largest cities 
from the Japan Real Estate Institute: http://www.reinet.or.jp/index-e.htm.) Re-examining  the  Contributions  of  Money  and  Banking  Shocks  ?  221 
the pattern of retained  earnings  during  the U.S.  Great Depression  raise 
questions  about the asset-price  story. First, if lower  asset prices contrib- 
uted  to the  U.S.  Great Depression,  why  didn't  a similar decrease  pro- 
duce a Great Depression  in Japan? Second,  if the macroeconomic  impact 
of  lower  prices  is  through  lower  borrower  net  worth,  as  is  often  pre- 
sumed  in the  literature,  then  why  did firms continue  to pay  such  divi- 
dends  during the 1930s rather than increase retained earnings? Finally, if 
decreases  in asset  values  have  a substantial  negative  effect  on  output, 
through  either borrower  or consumer  net  worth,  then  why  did the  in- 
crease  in asset  prices  have  so  little effect  in either Japan or the  United 
States? Any theory of the Depression  based on lower asset values  should 
be  able to explain  why  lower  asset  prices  don't  always  produce  major 
depressions,  and explain  why  retained earnings  fell in the 1930s.35 
6.2 THE  FALL  IN TOTAL  FACTOR  PRODUCTIVITY 
The second  alternative  shock  we  consider  is a total factor productivity 
(TFP) shock.  This shock  is much  different  during  the Great Depression 
than other periods  and in particular differs sharply from 1921-1922.  TFP 
rose about 5% relative  to trend in 1921, but fell about 14% below  trend 
between  1929 and 1933.36 
It is unlikely  that this TFP decrease  during  the  Great Depression  re- 
flects technological  regress  or is solely  due to factor measurement  error. 
To see this latter point,  consider  three types  of measurement  error: capi- 
tal utilization,  changes  in labor quality, and  changes  in capital quality. 
The utilization  of the capital stock was low during the Great Depression, 
and this overstatement  of the capital input will bias down  TFP measure- 
ment.  But the other two  sources  of factor mismeasurement  will tend  to 
offset  mismeasured  capital  input.  The  average  quality  of  labor  input 
probably  rose  during  the  Depression,  as  the  least  productive  workers 
were  probably  the  first to  be  laid  off.  This  indicates  that measures  of 
labor input based on employment  or hours worked  will understate  labor 
input  in efficiency  units.  Similarly, the oldest,  least efficient  capital was 
idled  during  the  Depression  (Bresnahan  and  Raff, 1991). This "vintage 
effect" implies  that measures  of  capital  input  based  on  the  number  of 
35. These  data  cast doubt  on  the  ability of theoretical  models  in which  financial-market 
imperfections  amplify  the  effects  of macroeconomic  shocks  by reducing  net  worth  to 
explain  a significant  portion  of the Great Depression.  [See Kiyotaki and Moore,  1997, 
and Bernanke,  Gertler, and Gilchrist, 2000 (BGG).] According  to these  models,  output 
should  have  expanded  significantly  when  stock  prices  were  rising.  Moreover,  these 
models  predict that enterprises  should  have substantially  increased internal cash when 
share prices began  falling.  Both of these  predictions  stand in contrast to the data. 
36. Romer  (1988) argues  that  there  was  a favorable  supply  shock  during  the  1921-1922 
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idle  factories  will  understate  capital  input  in  efficiency  units.  Both  of 
these  compositional  effects  will  tend  to  understate  the  true  decline  in 
TFP and tend  to offset the effect of capital utilization. 
Since labor's share is about twice as large as capital's share,  consider- 
able  mismeasurement  of  capital  utilization  is  required  to bias  the  TFP 
measure.  For example,  if true capital  input  was  20% lower  than  mea- 
sured  capital  input  after correcting  for vintage  effects,  and  true  labor 
input  in efficiency  units  was  5% higher  than measured  labor input  due 
to compositional  shifts,  TFP would  have decreased by 11%, compared  to 
the measured  decrease  of 14%. 
Negative  productivity  shocks  also  show  up  in  disaggregated  data. 
Bernanke  and  Parkinson  (1991) report negative  productivity  shocks  in 
manufacturing  and argue that the shocks reflect labor hoarding or increas- 
ing  returns  to scale.  But there  are good  reasons  to question  these  two 
explanations.  Recent  research  indicates  CRS in  manufacturing,  rather 
than increasing  returns. And at least the traditional reason given for labor 
hoarding-the  cost of laying  off and subsequently  rehiring a worker ex- 
ceeds  the  cost of retaining  the worker-seems  unlikely  during  this pe- 
riod. Managers seem to have been liquidating their enterprises  during the 
Great Depression,  rather than planning  for an upcoming  expansion  that 
would  have productively  utilized  the hoarded  labor. 
The TFP decrease  may  not be  adequately  explained  by technological 
regress,  factor mismeasurement,  or returns  to  scale.  More  research  is 
needed  to determine  the sources  of and reasons for this large change and 
how  much  it may  have  contributed  to  the  Great  Depression.  Since  a 
decrease  in productivity  reduces  marginal  productivity,  this shock  may 
represent  the best  chance  for the wage  hypothesis  to account  for a rea- 
sonable  fraction of the output  decrease. 
7. Summary  and  Conclusion 
Our results  suggest  that two popular  stories  for the Great Depression 
the inflexible-wage  deflation story and the banking-shock  story-account 
for only a small fraction of the output fall that occurred between  1929 and 
1933. The problem with the inflexible-wage  story is that measured  wages 
were  above  trend in only a subset  of the economy,  and that a reasonable 
correction  for  shifts  in  the  composition  of  employment  would  reduce 
those  wage  measures  below  trend. The problem with the banking-shock 
story is that the shock is small, and the elasticity of aggregate output with 
respect to a banking shock is also small. Moreover,  three important auxil- 
iary predictions  of the  banking  story  don't  line  up  with  the  data.  The 
theory predicts that states that had worse banking crises should  have had Re-examining  the  Contributions  of Money  and  Banking  Shocks  *  223 
worse  depressions.  But there is no systematic  relationship  between  state 
economic  activity and the number  of bank closings.  The theory also pre- 
dicts  that firms should  have  increased  internal  cash in response  to the 
banking shock. In contrast, firms reduced retained earnings substantially 
during  the  Great Depression.  The theory  also predicts  that the  ratio of 
bank deposits  to output  should  have  decreased  during  the Depression. 
This ratio increased  substantially  during the Depression.  Any successful 
financial  intermediation  theory  of the Depression  should  be  consistent 
with  these  three facts. 
We conclude  that the Great Depression  remains  a puzzle.  The paper 
suggests  two  directions  for future research.  One  direction  is to analyze 
money  (deflation)  shocks  through  alternative  channels.  The second  di- 
rection is to analyze  real shocks.  The fact that real output  per adult fell 
13% in  1930 without  any  significant  deflation  suggests  the  possibility 
that  a  real  shock  contributed  to  the  initial  downturn.  And  the  large 
decrease  in TFP suggests  the  possibility  that some  shock  may have  af- 
fected productivity  during the Great Depression. 
Appendix.  Characterizing  the Equilibrium  of the  Financial- 
Intermediation  Model 
In what  follows,  we  will assume  that the difference  in the idiosyncratic 
productivity  shocks is small enough  that the nonnegativity  constraint on 
retained  earnings  never  binds.  Under  this  assumption,  the  f.o.c.s  that 
characterize a solution  include 
3tu'(ct) =  At,  (13) 
AtyAEt,  i(Kt,i +  xt,i)-  =  lt  -  5t,i,  where  xi  t,i =  0,  (14) 
At+lyAEt[Et+l,i(Kt+,i+Xt+l,i)Y-  ] =  At,  (15) 
,Gt+lG1(Dt+l,  Z)  =  At,  (16) 
where  gt,  At, and  t,i are the Lagrange multipliers  on the constraints  (9) 
and (10) and the nonnegativity  constraints  on xi, respectively. 
It is  easy  to  see  from  the  f.o.c.  on  plant  capital,  (15), that  K1 =  K2. 
Hence  we  can aggregate  plant  capital and treat (K, D) as the state vari- 
ables,  where  K/2  is  plant  capital.  It is  easy  to  see  that  x, cannot  be 
positive,  since condition  (14) would  imply that xh  was  also positive,  and 
hence  at both  plants  the  marginal  product  of capital would  be  greater 
than At-_,  which  would  contradict (15). 
The steady  state of this model  will be given by (K, D), where 224 *  COLE  & OHANIAN 
/  K  \'-1  K  r-i  1 
PYA  E  2  +G(D,  Z)  +  El  =1,  (17) 
PyAeh  -2 +G(D,  Z)  G1(D,Z)  _  1,  (18) 
with  strict equality  if D >  0, and c is given  by 
1  /K  y  1  KY 
c-Ah  G(DZ)  +  AE  -(K  -D)  2  2  2  2 
We can develop  the analysis  further by assuming  an explicit functional 
form for G. the  Leontieff  specification  allows  us  to  obtain  closed-form 
solutions  for the variables D and K: 
G(D,  Z)  =  min(aD,  Z), 
where  a <  1, and (1 -  a)D is the cost of intermediation. 
If D is positive  and interior, that is, less than Z, it is straightforward  to 
show  that 
D  =-(3,Ay)11/-Y)  eh  )-  -J  (19) 
a 
E  2a  -  1 
If the value  of D is such  that D E [0, Z/a],  then  the steady-state  level  of 
Kis 
K -  (3AYE  1  r)  2a-  1, 
If the value of D implied by (19) is negative,  then it is easy to show  that in 
the steady  state D = 0, and 
K =  (yA  (Eh +  \1))  Y 
If the value  of D implied  by  (19) is greater than Z/a,  then  in the steady 
state D = Z and K is the solution  to (17) when  we  set G(D, Z) = Z. 
This allows us to conduct some comparative statics on what happens  to 
K and D when  intermediation  capital changes.  If Z binds,  then dK/dZ < 0 Re-examining  the  Contributions  of  Money  and  Banking  Shocks  *  225 
and d(K +  aD)/dZ  >  O. Furthermore,  if D >  0, then  d(aD)/da  >  0, and 
hence  dK/da  <  O, while  d(K +  aD)/da  >  O. Our model  predicts  that a 
decrease  in intermediation  capital increases  internally  installed  capital, 
but significantly  reduces intermediated  investment.  Similarly, an increase 
in the cost of intermediation  (1 -  a) increases  internally installed  capital 
and  reduces  intermediated  investment.  It is  also  easy  to  see  how  the 
spread in the lending  and borrowing  rate is affected by a change  in Z. In 
this example,  the marginal cost  of funds  to the high-productivity  plant 
must be 
1 +  rb =  YAEh(K/2 +  aD)7-1. 
The interest rate on savings  must be 
1 +  r  AEh(K/2 +  raD)"-1a. 
This implies  that the spread between  these  two rates is given by 
rb -  r, =  yAeh(K/2  +  aD)Y-l(1  -  a). 
A decrease  in intermediation  capital that binds will lower the quantity 
of  intermediated  capital,  aD,  and  raise  the  quantity  financed  out  of 
retained earnings,  K. It also raises both the borrowing  and lending  inter- 
est rates and the spread between  them,  since  the marginal productivity 
of  capital  at  the  high-productivity  plant  is  raised.  The  spread  also  is 
decreasing  in a,  which  governs  the fraction of capital consumed  by the 
intermediation  process. 
Finally, assume  that  GD, Gz, GDZ  >  0 for all D,  Z >  0. In this case,  a 
reduction  in Z works  like an increase in intermediation  costs.  Since G is 
CRS, G(D,Z)  = g(Z/D)D,  where  g'  >  O. In response  to a decrease  in Z, 
the  equilibrium  level  of Z/D  will  increase.  This indicates  that the  rele- 
vant  factor  for intermediation  costs  is  not  the  level  of  intermediation 
capital  per  se,  but  the  level  relative  to  the  quantity  of  intermediated 
capital. 
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1. Introduction 
Cole and Ohanian's  paper is both ambitious  and provocative.  It is ambi- 
tious because  it investigates  the ability of several alternative and widely 
cited  explanations  of the  Great Depression  to  explain  the  quantitative 
magnitude  of  the  output  downturn  that  occurred  in  1929-1933.  It is 
provocative  because  it concludes  that none  of the  standard  battery  of 
explanations  can account for more than a small fraction of the observed 
output  decline. 
One explanation that Cole and Ohanian test is the sticky-wage  hypothe- 
sis: that the massive  deflation  of 1929-1933  depressed  output by driving 
up  real  wages.  Their  results  are  very  different  from  our  findings  in 
"Money,  sticky  wages,  and  the  Great Depression"  (Bordo,  Erceg,  and 
Evans, 2000), in which we find that the sticky-wage  channel accounts  for 
1. This paper represents  the views of the authors  and should not be interpreted  as reflect- 
ing the views of the Board of Governors  of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago, other members of their staff, or the National Bureau  of Eco- 
nomic Research. 
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about  70% of the  output  decline  over  1929-1933.  In this  comment,  we 
focus on several key problems with the authors' formulation that account 
for the divergence  in our results. We conclude by discussing  their compari- 
son  of the  postwar  disinflation  in 1920-1921  with  the  disinflation  over 
1929-1933.  In the  subsequent  comment,  Mark Gertler focuses  on  Cole 
and  Ohanian's  test  of the bank-failure  explanation  for the  Depression. 
2.  Evaluation  of Cole  and  Ohanian's  Modelfor  Testing 
the  Sticky-Wage  Hypothesis 
In  our  paper  "Money,  sticky  wages,  and  the  Great  Depression,"  we 
construct a dynamic  general equilibrium  model  to evaluate  whether  the 
monetary  contraction over 1929-1933  can account for the output decline. 
Our  model  has  only  one  productive  sector,  with  capital and  labor the 
only  inputs.  The representative  agent  makes  consumption-investment 
decisions  based  on the permanent-income  hypothesis,  and has rational 
expectations.  Persistent  negative  shocks  to  money  growth  over  1930- 
1933 cause a largely unanticipated  fall in the price levels.  Because wages 
are sluggish  to adjust to the employment  gap,  real wages  rise,  causing 
hours worked  and output  to contract progressively.  The negative  effects 
of the real-wage  rise on hours  worked  are exacerbated by the decline  in 
the capital stock. 
Our simple  model  accounts  surprisingly  well  for the joint behavior  of 
output,  hours worked,  and our measure  of the real wage  over the down- 
turn phase  of the Depression,  particularly over 1929-1932.  We interpret 
our  results  as  providing  support  for  the  null  hypothesis  that  (unex- 
pected)  contractionary  shocks  to  money  operating  through  a  sticky- 
wage  channel  played  a  substantial  role  in  the  output  downturn.  As 
always,  "support" is taken to mean nonrejection: it is possible  that other 
explanations  may  perform  as well  or better at accounting  for the  same 
stylized  facts, in which  case we would  need  an additional basis to differ- 
entiate  between  the models. 
Cole  and  Ohanian  develop  a two-sector  model  in order to allow  for 
potentially  different  real-wage  behavior  across  the  manufacturing  and 
nonmanufacturing  sectors.  Aside  from this formal difference,  there are 
several  key  features  that  account  for  their  rejection  of  the  null  that 
nominal  wage  stickiness  accounts  for a sizeable  fraction  of the  output 
downturn.  First, Cole and Ohanian  assume  that real wages  adjust flexi- 
bly  (in  a  spot  labor  market)  in  the  nonmanufacturing  sector,  which 
comprises  72% of employment  in their baseline  calibration (government 
is also included  in their manufacturing  sector).  Second,  the shock to the Comment 229 
real product  wage  in manufacturing  implied  by their model  greatly un- 
derstates  the  observed  increase.  Third,  Cole  and  Ohanian  simply  as- 
sume  that  trend  productivity  grew  at 2% per  year over  the  1929-1933 
period.  We consider  each  of these  restrictions  in turn below.  We argue 
that they appear unjustified  empirically, and thus strongly bias Cole and 
Ohanian's  model  against the sticky-wage  hypothesis. 
2.1 WERE  WAGES  IN THE  NONMANUFACTURING  SECTOR 
PERFECTLY  FLEXIBLE? 
Cole and Ohanian  motivate  modeling  wage  behavior  outside  the manu- 
facturing  sector  as  perfectly  flexible,  based  on  wage  behavior  in  the 
farming  sector. In the upper  panel  of Table 4 of their paper,  they  show 
that real farm wages  (deflated by the GNP deflator) collapsed  during the 
Great Depression,  falling over 40% between  1929 and 1933.2 
While it is probably reasonable  to model  the farming sector as having 
flexible wages,  there is little support  for extending  this characterization 
to the remainder of private nonmanufacturing.  First, the farming sector 
was  quite small at the onset  of the Depression,  accounting  for only  10% 
of national  income,  or about  14% of the national  income  attributable to 
the private  nonmanufacturing  sector. Moreover,  according  to Kendrick 
(1961), the farm sector constituted  about  11% of the total labor input  to 
the private  nonmanufacturing  sector on  a quality-adjusted  basis  (Table 
A-5, p. 267). 
Second,  the  farming  sector appears  to have  behaved  very  differently 
from the remainder of the private nonmanufacturing  sector. Table 1 com- 
pares employment  in farming  to employment  in the  (private) non-farm 
non-manufacturing  sector.  While  employment  in  farming  remained 
nearly  stable,  employment  in nonfarm  nonmanufacturing  fell  30% by 
1933. Table 2 considers  the relative price of farm output,  derived by deflat- 
ing the wholesale  price index (WPI) for farm products by the GNP defla- 
tor. Real farm prices collapsed  during the 1929-1933  period,  declining by 
somewhat  over 40% by 1933 (about the same fall as in the real wage).  On 
the other hand,  the decline in relative farm prices and the relative price of 
manufactured  goods  over the 1929-1933  period  (discussed  below)  imply 
that the real price of nonfarm  nonmanufactured  goods  must  have  risen 
over the period. 
Even without  considering  wage  data directly, the data on employment 
and relative prices suggest  very different wage  behavior  across the farm 
and  nonfarm  nonmanufacturing  sectors.  The  fact that  employment  in 
farming  remained  almost  stable  despite  a massive  fall in  the  product 
2. Data on real wages  and output reported by Cole and Ohanian are adjusted by determin- 
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Table 1  EMPLOYMENT IN THE 
NONMANUFACTURING 
SECTOR (CHANGE FROM 
1929) 
Change 
(percentage  pts.) 
Year  Farma  Nonfarmb 
1930  -2.1  -4.8 
1931  -0.1  -14.2 
1932  0.4  -26.9 
1933  -0.2  -30.4 
aKendrick  (1961,  Table  B-1). 
bUnited  States Department  of Commerce  (1981,  Table 
6.8A). 
Table 2  REAL PRICE OF FARM 
OUTPUTa (CHANGE FROM 
1929) 
WPIb 
Year  (percentage  points) 
1930  -14.0 
1931  -35.5 
1932  -53.3 
1933  -44.8 
aSource:  Bureau of Labor Statistics, Wholesale  Prices, 
June 1934,  Table  1. 
bFor  farm  products,  divided by GNP deflator. 
price would  require a corresponding  collapse  in the real wage  (measured 
relative  to  the  GNP  deflator).  This  is  exactly  what  was  observed.  By 
contrast, the sharp decline  in employment  in the nonfarm nonmanufac- 
turing  sector  despite  a  rise  in  the  relative  price  of  its  output  would 
suggest  that the real wage  in that sector rose.3 
Table 3 compares  a measure  of the aggregate  real wage  that we  con- 
structed  in  our  paper  (2000)  with  the  manufacturing  real  wage.  The 
nonmanufacturing  real wage  behaves  quite similarly to the manufactur- 
3. Our  argument  implicitly  assumes-as  in  Bernanke  and  Parkinson  (1991)-that  there 
was  not  a sizable  fall in total factor productivity  during  the  1929-1933  period.  In this 
case, the nonfarm nonmanufacturing  sector's  labor demand  curve would  be reasonably 
stable, except  for movements  in the capital stock.  Thus,  a large observed  fall in sectoral 
employment  (despite  a relative price rise) would  require a rise in that sector's real wage. Comment 231 
Table  3  REAL  WAGES  (USING  GNP DEFLATOR)a  (CHANGE  FROM  1929, IN 
PERCENTAGE  POINTS) 
1930  1931  1932  1933 
Aggregate (all industries)  2.4  7.2  9.7  5.8 
Manufacturing  3.5  9.2  10.7  10.6 
aThese  real  wage measures  are derived  by deflating  average  hourly  earnings  by the GNP deflator.  The 
average  hourly earnings  series are described  in Bordo,  Erceg,  and Evans  (2000),  footnote  2. 
ing real wage  (when  wages  are deflated  by a common  deflator), at least 
through  1932. We admit that there are important  reasons  to be cautious 
about  drawing  inferences  from  the  aggregate  wage  data,  particularly 
given  that  information  about  average  hours  worked  is  sparse  in most 
sectors outside  of manufacturing.  Nevertheless,  at the very least there is 
direct evidence  suggesting  that wages  in the nonfarm nonmanufacturing 
sector  rose  somewhat,  and  the behavior  of sectoral  relative  prices  and 
that  of  employment  seem  consistent  with  the  real  wage  movement. 
Thus,  Cole  and  Ohanian's  decision  to  assume  flexible  wages  in  the 
nonmanufacturing  sector based  on evidence  of wage  behavior  in farm- 
ing seems  difficult to justify. This choice biases  their model  against find- 
ing an important role for the sticky-wage  channel. 
2.2 DOES  THE  IMPLIED  BEHAVIOR  OF THE  PRODUCT 
REAL  WAGE  IN MANUFACTURING  FIT  THE  DATA? 
In Cole  and  Ohanian's  model,  manufacturing  output  depends  on  the 
product  real wage,  the  capital stock in manufacturing,  and the level  of 
technology.  The form of the dependence  can be seen by taking the loga- 
rithm of the representative  manufacturing  firm's first-order condition  for 
choosing  hours worked: 
1 
hmt  =  k-  (wmt -  Pmt-  at).  (1) 
Here hmt  is the (natural) log of hours worked  in manufacturing,  kmt  is the 
log of the manufacturing  capital stock, wmt  is the log of the manufacturing 
wage  deflated by the GNP deflator (the "consumer" real wage),  Pmt  is the 
log of the price of the manufactured  goods  deflated by the GNP deflator, 
and  at is  the  log  of  an  index  of  technology.  The  product  real wage  in 
manufacturing  is simply  the difference between  the consumer  real wage 
in manufacturing  and  the  real  price  of manufacturing  output  (wmt -  pmt)' 
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Table 4  REAL WAGES AND  RELATIVE  PRICES IN MANUFACTURINGa 
(CHANGE FROM 1929) 
Change  (percentage  points) 
Consumer  real  wage  Real  price  of  Product  real  wage 
in manufacturing,  manufactured  good,  in manufacturing, 
Year  Wmt  Pmt  Wmt 
- 
Pmt 
1930  3.5  -5.1  8.6 
1931  9.2  -9.7  18.9 
1932  10.7  -6.8  17.5 
1933  10.6  -3.7  14.4 
aThe deflator  for manufacturing  output  is  the  WPI for nonagricultural  products,  from the  Bureau of 
Labor Statistics,  Wholesale  Prices, June 1934, Table 3. 
quence  of unanticipated  shocks  to the consumer  real wage  in manufac- 
turing (wmt).  The shock in each period  is assumed  to equal the deviation 
of the  observed  consumer  real wage  from its 1929 value,  except  for an 
adjustment  for "trend" productivity  growth  that we  discuss  below.  The 
unadjusted  consumer  real-wage  series  is shown  in the  first column  of 
Table 4 (it is identical to the second  column  of Table 3). While wmt  is taken 
as exogenous,  the relative price Pmt  is endogenously  determined,  depend- 
ing  inversely  on  the  output  of  the  manufactured  relative  to  the  non- 
manufactured  good.  Cole  and Ohanian's  model  generates  a substantial 
rise in the real price of the manufactured  good,  and thus implies  a rise in 
the product real wage  that is much smaller than the rise in the consumer 
real wage. 
This  implication  is  contradicted  by  the  data.  The  second  column  of 
Table 4 shows  the real price of manufacturing  output,  defined  as a defla- 
tor for manufacturing  output  divided  by the GNP deflator. The real price 
of manufacturing  output  had  fallen by  10% in  1931 relative  to its  1929 
level.  This implies  that the product real wage  (column 3) rose 10 percent- 
age  points  more than  the consumer  real wage  in that year. By contrast, 
Cole  and Ohanian  report that their model  implies  a rise in the product 
real wage  that is 4.4% less than  the  rise in  the  consumer  real wage  in 
1931. 
Thus,  Cole  and Ohanian's  model  appears  to seriously  understate  the 
shock  to  the  product  real wage  in manufacturing.  Even  ignoring  their 
subtraction  of "trend productivity  growth"  from the product  real wage 
implied  by their model,  their model  understates  the rise in the product 
real wage  by  10-15  percentage  points  over  the  Depression  downturn. 
Holding  manufacturing  capital constant,  this would  translate into a seri- Comment  *  233 
ous  understatement  of the effects  of a rise in the  real product  wage  on 
manufacturing  output. 
To gauge  the  effects  of  understating  the  shock  to  the  product  real 
wage,  note from (1) that the elasticity of labor demand  in manufacturing 
is 1/0, where  0 is the capital share in manufacturing.  Since  0 =  3 in their 
calibration,  we  can  take  this  elasticity  to  equal  3.  Thus,  relative  to  a 
model  that simply  took the product real wage  as exogenous  and equal to 
our values  in column  3, their model  understates  the decline  in manufac- 
turing output by 30-45%.  Moreover, because  this understatement  of the 
rise in the product  wage  greatly reduces  the effect of the wage  shock on 
aggregate  output in their model,  it also mitigates  the fall in the manufac- 
turing  capital  stock.  Thus,  their  model's  understatement  of  the  wage 
shock  may  have  a considerably  larger  effect  on  manufacturing  hours 
worked  and output  through  the capital channel. 
2.3 IS IT  APPROPRIATE  TO SCALE  FOR  TREND 
PRODUCTIVITY  GROWTH? 
Cole and Ohanian  assume  that productivity  grows  at a constant  rate of 
2% per year over the 1929-1933 period.  Given this assumption,  they take 
the wage  shock to manufacturing  to be the consumer  wage  (in column  1 
of Table 4) scaled down  for trend productivity  growth,  i.e.,  wmt  -  at. 
The assumption  of trend productivity  growth obviously  makes it more 
difficult  to account  for an output  downturn,  particularly in  1932-1933. 
Given the preference specification,  this means that output and real wages 
in each  sector would  grow  2% per year  in the  absence  of any  shocks. 
Moreover,  the size of the exogenous  shock to the consumer  real wage  in 
the manufacturing  sector is scaled down  from what is reported in column 
1 of  Table 4.  As  a  result,  the  baseline  parameterization  of  Cole  and 
Ohanian's  model  implies that while  GDP falls below  trend in 1929-1933, 
the level of GDP rises continuously  over the period. Even output in manu- 
facturing, the sticky-wage  sector, rises above its 1929 level by 1933! 
We believe  that the inclusion  of this trend term lacks justification,  at 
least  over  the  period  considered.  It seems  especially  puzzling  given 
that the authors argue that "[aggregate] total faster productivity  fell about 
14%  percent below trend between  1929 and 1933." If total factor productiv- 
ity in fact declined,  it may be more appropriate to extract a negative trend, 
or to allow  for negative  shocks  to productivity.  Allowing  for a negative 
trend would  of course allow sticky wages  in manufacturing  to exert much 
larger output  effects  (even  more  so  if the  relative-price  problem  in the 
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the conclusion  of the paper when  they state that "a decrease in productiv- 
ity ...  may represent the best chance for the wage hypothesis  to account 
for a reasonable  fraction of the output  decrease." 
In our own  model,  we  take a conservative  approach  and assume  that 
productivity  remained  unchanged  over  1929-1933.  However,  we  agree 
with  Cole  and  Ohanian  that it would  be  interesting  to further investi- 
gate  the  implications  of  a possible  fall in  total  factor productivity,  de- 
spite  the obvious  difficulties  in constructing  a convincing  measure  over 
this period. 
2.4 SUMMARY  OF KEY  PROBLEMS  WITH  MODEL 
Cole  and  Ohanian  claim  to  be  testing  the  null  hypothesis  that  wage 
stickiness  accounted  for  the  Great  Depression.  A  convincing  test  re- 
quires  building  a  model  that  is  favorable  to  the  null,  subject  to  the 
constraints  imposed  by the data. We argue that Cole and Ohanian  con- 
struct a model  that is unduly  biased against the null hypothesis,  and this 
accounts  for their rejection. 
It is important  to emphasize  that the different  results  they  derive  are 
primarily  driven  by  the  three  features  of the  model  discussed  (in Sec- 
tions 2.1-2.3)  above,  and not from other features of their setup,  e.g.,  the 
fact that their model  has  two  sectors  instead  of one.  Some  preliminary 
work  that we  have  done  suggests  that a multisector  model  can account 
for a very  substantial  output  downturn  if it: (1) takes  the  product  real 
wage  in manufacturing  as exogenous  (fitting it to the observed  product- 
real-wage  series),  (2) allows  for some  degree  of rigidity  in the  product 
real wage  in the nonmanufacturing  sector, even  if considerably  less than 
in  manufacturing,  and  (3) assumes  total  factor productivity  growth  is 
zero over the 1929-1933  period. 
From  a  methodological  perspective,  the  authors'  introduction  of  a 
multisectoral  model  to  study  the  Depression  period  is  innovative  and 
welcome.  The authors highlight  how  the farm sector behaved  differently 
over  that period,  and  future  research  may  identify  sectoral  differences 
that have important consequences  for the effects of a shock on aggregate 
activity. Regarding  the  monetary  transmission  mechanism,  our prefer- 
ence  is to model  it directly  rather than take the reduced-form  approach 
of assuming  an exogenous  real wage  shock.  The authors'  approach  in- 
volves  an  unpalatable  assumption  about  how  agents  in  the  model  as- 
sume  the real wage  will eventually  adjust to equilibrate the labor market 
(viz.,  the  manufacturing  real wage  is expected  to adjust  flexibly  in the 
subsequent  year).  The transmission  mechanism,  including  the  process 
by which  wages  are expected  to adjust,  has  critical implications  for the 
response  of the capital stock to a shock. Comment 235 
3.  Why  Was  the  Disinflation  of 1920-1921  Different 
from  the  Disinflation  of 1929-1933? 
The authors  emphasize  that for an explanation  linking  the large output 
contraction of 1929-1933  to deflation  to be plausible,  it should  be able to 
explain  why  a  similar-sized  deflation  in  1920-1921  had  different  real 
effects.  In our NBER Working Paper version  of  "Money, sticky  wages, 
and  the  Great Depression"  (1997), we  proposed  the  same  "consistency 
check" to evaluate the plausibility  of the sticky-wage  channel.  It is worth- 
while  briefly  restating  our interpretation  of the  two  periods,  since  it is 
strongly  at variance with  that proposed  by Cole and Ohanian. 
In our estimation,  two  key  differences  mainly  account for why  defla- 
tion in 1920-1921  induced  a smaller and less prolonged  downturn  in real 
activity than the deflation  of 1929-1933.  First, the deflation  in 1920-1921 
was more predictable than in 1929-1933,  and considerably  shorter-lived. 
Second,  wage-setting  practices in the early 1920s were more flexible than 
later in the decade. 
Our contention  that the  deflation  of 1920-1921  was  more predictable 
requires  some  clarification.  The  disinflation  was  predictable  insofar  as 
contemporaries  of the period expected  that the authorities would  pursue 
a monetary policy that supported  the gold standard at the prewar parity. 
Since prices had risen rapidly during both World War I and into the early 
interwar  period,  it was  clear that  tight  monetary  policy  and  deflation 
would  be required  to maintain  the  gold  standard  after the  embargo  on 
gold  exports was lifted in June 1919. The main uncertainty  involved  the 
timing  and  speed  of  the  eventual  disinflation.  The  authorities  com- 
pounded  this uncertainty by pursuing  an accomodative  monetary policy 
through  late  1919,  despite  substantial  gold  outflows.  The  authorities 
then  abruptly tightened  policy,  inducing  a price decline  that was  much 
sharper  than  in  1929-1933.  The  GNP  deflator  fell 24% between  1920:3 
and  1921:2, and  an additional  8% by  1922:1 before  roughly  stabilizing. 
Output began  contracting in 1920:1, and fell by 17% over the subsequent 
year-slightly  more than the  14% decline  that occurred during  the first 
year  of  the  Great Depression.4  Friedman  and  Schwartz  (1963, p.  232) 
characterize  the downturn  as "one of the severest  on record. Its brevity 
makes annual data misleading  guides  to its severity." 
Thus,  the 1920-1921  depression  was in fact quite severe.  According  to 
Friedman and Schwartz,  the real effects were  exacerbated by a twofold 
error of the monetary  authorities: first, their refusal to move  to a tighter 
policy  stance  immediately  following  the end  of the world  war; and sec- 
4. Our source for the quarterly  real GNP and the GNP deflator  series is Balke  and Gordon 
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ond,  by  tightening  policy  too  sharply  once  they  finally  decided  to 
disinflate.  However,  the policy  of disinflation  rapidly  gained  credibility 
once in place. Agents  realized that it was crucial for maintaining  the gold 
standard,  and was  in fact similar to the policies  being  pursued  by other 
central banks.  Thus,  the  disinflation  episode  was  relatively  short-lived, 
prices  stabilized,  and  a rapid recovery  ensued.  Output  recovered  to its 
predepression  peak  within  a year  and  a half  of the  trough.  Relatively 
flexible wage-setting  policies-in  which wages  fell quickly with prices- 
aided in the quick recovery. 
By contrast, the price deflation in the Great Depression  was drawn out 
over a considerably  longer period.  It is much less plausible  that the defla- 
tion was anticipated: it occurred after a long period of price stability, and 
was  associated  with  a large  drop  in the  money  multiplier  due  to bank 
failures and policy  inaction.  Moreover,  the real effects of the disinflation 
were likely exacerbated by the adoption  of less flexible wage-setting  prac- 
tices in the late 1920s. As O'Brien (1989) has emphasized,  this change  in 
wage-setting  is in part attributable to the mistaken belief that maintaining 
consumer  purchasing  power  (through keeping  nominal  wages  high) was 
the key to ameliorating  the effects of business  cycles.5 
Thus, we  disagree  with  the basic thrust of Cole and Ohanian's  charac- 
terization  of the  two  disinflation  episodes:  namely,  that the  1920-1921 
disinflation  was both less anticipated  than the disinflation  of 1929-1933, 
and yet associated  with  a very mild output  downturn.  It is true that the 
disinflation  of  1920-1921  had  a surprise  component,  as the timing  and 
speed  of the monetary  tightening  weren't  known  ex ante.  This contrib- 
uted to a sharp downturn  in real activity, the severity  of which  is under- 
stated  by  Cole  and  Ohanian  (due  to  their  reliance  on  annual  data). 
However,  we  have  argued  that a much  larger component  of the overall 
disinflation  was  predictable  in  1920-1921,  that  the  disinflation  in  any 
event  was  short-lived,  and  that  these  factors helped  output  to bounce 
back quickly. While the authors use annual data on both nominal  and ex 
post  real interest rates as the basis for concluding  that the disinflation  of 
1920-1921  was  less anticipated,  we believe  that using  such data to make 
inferences  about inflation  expectations  is highly  problematic.  The 1920- 
1921 period  was  very  turbulent,  as a large inflation  was  followed  by  a 
5. The theory  that sharp wage  cuts during  the  1920-1921  depression  had induced  a more 
severe  output  downturn  by reducing  household  purchasing  power  became  quite popu- 
lar in the  1920s, even  among  the business  community.  Individual  firms were  urged  to 
sacrifice their private gain (cutting wages)  to help secure the overall benefit of maintain- 
ing household  purchasing  power.  Thus,  while  Cole and Ohanian  are correct that Presi- 
dent  Hoover  encouraged  employers  to avoid  wage  cuts,  there was  substantial  support 
for such  a policy  during  the  first two  years  of the  Depression.  Moreover,  pressure  on 
employers  to keep wages  high appears to have extended  well beyond  the manufacturing 
sector. Comment  237 
quick deflation.  Real interest  rates swung  wildly,  with  the  (annualized) 
ex post  short-term  real interest  rate fluctuating  from roughly  -20%  in 
the  first half of 1920 to 45-50%  in the  second  half of that year. In such 
circumstances,  the usual  difficulties  of disentangling  the effects of shifts 
in inflation  expectations  on nominal  rates from the  effects  of changing 
real rates and risk premia are greatly exacerbated. 
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MARK  GERTLER 
New York  University  and NBER 
1. Introduction 
Cole and Ohanian  have produced  an interesting  and provocative  paper. 
On one point  I am in complete  argument: Any  explanation  of the Great 
Depression  should  ultimately involve  writing down  a quantitative model 
that captures  the  magnitude  of the  contraction.  At the  same  time,  it is 
important  to note  that in this paper the authors  do not provide  a model 
that rationalizes  the Depression.  Rather they  present  a set of particular 
models  with  the  objective  of  rejecting  certain  monetary  and  financial 
theories.  I will argue below  that neither of the two models  they develop 
is adequate for providing  a robust evaluation  of the theories  in question. 
In addition,  despite  the (welcome)  appeal to formal modeling,  much of 
Comment  237 
quick deflation.  Real interest  rates swung  wildly,  with  the  (annualized) 
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Comment 
MARK  GERTLER 
New York  University  and NBER 
1. Introduction 
Cole and Ohanian  have produced  an interesting  and provocative  paper. 
On one point  I am in complete  argument: Any  explanation  of the Great 
Depression  should  ultimately involve  writing down  a quantitative model 
that captures  the  magnitude  of the  contraction.  At the  same  time,  it is 
important  to note  that in this paper the authors  do not provide  a model 
that rationalizes  the Depression.  Rather they  present  a set of particular 
models  with  the  objective  of  rejecting  certain  monetary  and  financial 
theories.  I will argue below  that neither of the two models  they develop 
is adequate for providing  a robust evaluation  of the theories  in question. 
In addition,  despite  the (welcome)  appeal to formal modeling,  much of 238 *  GERTLER 
the analysis is in fact based on informal descriptive evidence.  The authors' 
empirical strategy is to evaluate  theories  on the basis of simple  compari- 
sons  of two  different  episodes.  The authors,  for example,  rule out debt 
deflation  as  a factor in  the  Great Depression  by  repeating  the  familiar 
argument  that the deflation  during  1920-1921  did not produce  a contrac- 
tion of similar magnitude  in the early 1930s (see, e.g.,  Kindleberger, 1986). 
Here the entire strategy rests on controlling  for other relevant differences 
across the two episodes.  I will argue below  that the authors have not done 
this control adequately.  Indeed,  the problem of omitted factors is an issue 
of concern in virtually the entire descriptive  analysis. 
To be clear, identification  of causal factors during the Great Depression 
is  a difficult  task.  However,  recent  literature,  beginning  with  Choudri 
and Kochin  (1980), Eichengreen  (1992), and Beranke  and James (1991), 
has made  considerable  progress  by focusing  on cross-country  evidence. 
It is puzzling  that  the  authors  completely  ignore  this  literature.  While 
the  authors  draw  inferences  from just  two  data points-the  1920-1921 
and 1929-1933  downturns  in the United States-the  cross-country  analy- 
sis  instead  exploits  a panel  of  twenty  to  thirty  observations.  On  this 
score,  using  the cross-country  data, Bernanke and James show  formally 
that debt-deflation  was  indeed  associated  with  major contractions. 
The paper is similarly  silent  on the well-known  work  of Eichengreen 
(1992) and others that emphasize  the role of the gold standard. This work 
puts monetary  factqrs at the center of the Depression  by showing  that the 
countries  that suffered  severe contractions were precisely  those that con- 
strained  their monetary  policy  to defend  the  gold  standard.  Countries 
that  freed  up  their  monetary  policies  by  abandoning  gold  early  fared 
much better. 
Beyond presenting  a compelling  case for monetary  factors, the issue  of 
the gold  standard circles directly back to debt-deflation:  The countries in 
Bernanke  and  James's  sample  that  experienced  simultaneously  defla- 
tion,  financial  crisis, and severe  depression  were  also  those  that stayed 
on the gold standard.  That is, the attempt to maintain  the gold standard 
by  monetary  tightening  was  apparently  at  least  one  of  a number  of 
possible  forces (in conjunction  with  other factors, e.g.  wage  rigidity and 
a weak  financial  system)  that  helped  propagate  deflation  and  depres- 
sion.  I would  certainly  agree  that  to  complete  the  argument  a formal 
model  is necessary.  On the other hand,  I don't see  how  the authors  can 
dismiss  debt-deflation  and other monetary  and financial forces as possi- 
ble factors without  confronting  this research. 
In  Section  2 below  I fill  in  some  important  missing  context  to  the 
authors' descriptive  analysis  by providing  a brief discussion  of the main 
events  of  the  Depression.  One  theme  I wish  to  emphasize  is  that,  in Comment 239 
contrast to  1920-1921,  the period  1929-1933  was  one  of sustained  con- 
tractionary forces. The Great Depression  was likely the cumulative  effect 
of these  forces, as opposed  to being  the consequence  of any single  factor 
in isolation. 
The initial downturn  of 1929-1930  was  due  in large part to a collapse 
in household  spending,  including  residential  investment.  It is reason- 
able to infer that monetary  and financial factors had an influence  on this 
early  spending  contraction.  However,  as  stressed  by  Friedman  and 
Schwartz  (1963), the  most  significant  effect  of  monetary  and  financial 
factors in the Depression  likely came after the economy  had already been 
weakened  substantially  by the initial downturn.1  At this time,  the com- 
bined  forces of debt-deflation,  strains in the banking  system,  and asset 
price contractions,  along with subsequent  tightening  of monetary policy, 
likely helped  turn what  had been  a severe  recession  into  a depression. 
By  contrast,  the  debt  deflation  and  high  real  rates  during  1920-1921 
occurred  in the wake  of a release  of pent-up  consumption  demand  fol- 
lowing  the  end  of  World War I and  in  the  midst  of  a more  favorable 
international  economic  climate  (see,  e.g.,  Temin,  1989).  Nor,  during 
1920-1921,  as Eichengreen  emphasizes,  was  U.S.  monetary  policy  con- 
strained by gold. 
In Sections 3 and 41 discuss  the models  of wage  rigidity and banking.  I 
argue  that  from  the  start the  authors'  model  does  not  give  the  wage- 
rigidity hypothesis  a fair hearing,  because  it does  not allow for nominal- 
wage  stickiness  and,  accordingly, precludes  the possibility  of the kind of 
contraction in aggregate  demand  that is the essence  of this hypothesis.  I 
argue  similarly  that  the  banking  model  is too  specialized  to provide  a 
robust assessment  and,  among  other things,  discuss  why  in general the 
cost  share  of banking  in GDP  is  unlikely  to provide  a measure  of the 
effects  of  a banking  crisis.  In Section  5,  I take issue  with  the  authors' 
interpretation  of the evidence  on each of the following  three topics:  (1) 
risk spreads,  (2) dividends,  and  (3) the Japanese stock-market  collapse. 
Concluding  remarks are in Section 6. 
2.  Overview  of the  Depression 
I now  provide  a brief description  of the  events  of the  Depression.  My 
goal  here  is to outline  the  case  for monetary  and  financial  factors and 
also to show  that simple  comparisons  with  1920-1921  can be misleading. 
1. This timing consideration is highly pertinent. Most historical analyses stress debt- 
deflation not as a causal factor  in the 1929-1930 downturn, but rather  as a factor  that 
helped turn  this downturn  into a protracted  depression.  The authors,  however, focus on 
its role in the early stages of the Depression. I elaborate  in the next section. 240 *  GERTLER 
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INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION (in logs) 
4.6  Ifi,  i  r  v  ...  .. 
4'6  ll'  ;;  r'  '  *  ;  L  :  s  '  i! 
4.46  .*'  *i  _, 
ik  ,,,  m, .  im 
4.43  '  - 
-  -.  r,  " 






*  * 
i  E 
4.3 
4.3  i  I  I  I  I 
4.3  ,  .,, 
i  k  fc^^  .,)  ^ijj.^  j|j^,  ,  '..  L..i,  Fe 
4.1  ~' ' 
a  co0  -  C  C  s 
CM  CN  CO  CD)  CO  C'  0 
Figure 1 plots the behavior  of log industrial production  over the period 
1928:1-1934:4.  Figure  2 plots  the  behavior  of the  nominal  commercial- 
paper rate along with  two measures  of inflation: the log difference  of the 
GNP deflator and the log difference  of the wholesale  price index  (WPI). 
In each  figure,  the  three  vertical  lines  mark dates  associated  with  the 
three  critical phases  of  the  Depression,  as  described  in  Friedman  and 
Schwartz:  (1) October  1929 (the  stock-market  crash);  (2) October  1930 
(the beginning  of the banking  crisis); (3) September  1931 (Britain's aban- 
donment  of the gold  standard).  I discuss  each phase  in turn. 
2.1 OCTOBER  1929 
After a period  of rob  ust economic  growth,  a slowdown  set in just prior 
to  the  stock-market  crash.  As  argued  by  Hamilton  (1987) and  Romer 
(1993),  tightening  of  monetary  policy  over  the  prior year  was  likely  a 
contributing  factor to this slowdown.2  Following  the  crash,  as Figure 1 
indicates,  there  is  a sharp  slide  in industrial  production  that does  not 
level  until  the  summer  of  1930. A  notable  aspect  of  this  initial  output 
contraction  was  the  sharp  collapse  in  household  spending,  including 
residential  investment  as  well  as  consumption  demand.  As  Table  1 
2. Hamilton  cites  the  gold  standard  and  a desire  by  the  Federal  Reserve  to  curb stock- 
market speculation  as the motive  for the tightening. Comment 241 
Figure  2 NOMINAL  CP RATE  VS. WPI  AND GNPD INFLATION 
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Table  1  COMPOSITION  OF OUTPUT  DROP 
Nondur. 
cons.  and  Dur.  Residential  Nonresid. 
GNP  services  cons.  investment Inventories  invest. 
%  change, 1929-  -9.9  -4.8  -20.9  -39.4  -117.1  -18.1 
1930 
%  contribution  to  100.0  29.4  16.9  20.4  20.4  23.9 
total:  1929-1930 
%  Ave. over post-  100.0  21.5  8.7  14.7  30.7  21.1 
war recessions 
shows,  between  1929 and  1930,  durable-goods  consumption  dropped 
20% and  residential  investment  plummeted  nearly  40%.  Overall,  the 
two  spending  components  accounted  for 37% of the  output  decline  in 
1930. Total household  spending  (obtained by adding  in nondurables  and 
services)  accounted  for  nearly  two-thirds  of  the  output  drop.  As  the 
table indicates,  relative to the norm provided  by postwar  recessions,  the 
relative contribution  of household  spending  was  unusually  large across 
all categories  (i.e.,  durable,  housing  and nondurable,  and services).3 
3. The average  contribution  of each  GDP component  to postwar  recessions  is taken from 
Romer (1996). 242 *  GERTLER 
Several pieces  of evidence  suggest  that monetary  and financial factors 
played  a role. First, as Figure 2 indicates,  the short-term nominal  interest 
rate rose steadily  over the preceding  year, reflecting the monetary  tight- 
ening.  Real  interest  rates  climbed  to  roughly  6% based  on  the  GDP 
deflator and 9% based  on the WPI. While the former is a broader-based 
index,  the latter is likely measured  with more precision,  especially  at the 
quarterly  frequency.4  In  addition  to  monetary  tightening,  credit  con- 
ditions-particularly  the weakness  in consumer  balance sheets  and gen- 
eral household  illiquidity  in the wake  of the stock-market  crash-likely 
also contributed  to the household  spending  drop,  according to evidence 
presented  by Mishkin  (1978) and Olney  (1999). 
To be  sure,  accounting  for the  huge  decline  in household  spending 
remains  an  unsolved  problem.  My  point  here  is  simply  that  there  is 
sufficient  evidence  to believe  that monetary  and financial factors had at 
least some  role of significance.  In addition,  frictions in financial markets 
seem  a natural avenue  to pursue  to help  account  for the sizable  drop in 
household  spending,  particularly  the  drop  in  consumer  durables  and 
residential  investment. 
The sharp drop in household  spending  stands  in sharp contrast to the 
downturn  between  1920 and 1921. As noted  in the introduction,  the end 
of World War I likely released  a pent-up  demand  for household  spend- 
ing,  particularly  for durable  goods.  Temin provides  more  detail  on  the 
factors  that  contributed  to  strong  household  demand.  The  contrac- 
tionary forces of debt deflation  and high real rates were thus partly offset 
by  this  strong  postwar  consumption  demand.5  Some  support  for this 
general  story  comes  from the  authors'  Table 1. Observe  that consump- 
tion actually rises in 1921. 
2.2 OCTOBER  1930 
Around this time the drop in industrial output slows,  but financial condi- 
tions  steadily  deteriorate.  Deflation  picks  up  momentum:  As  Figure  2 
suggests,  the GNP deflator begins  a protracted decline.  Due to the com- 
bined  effects  of  the  deflation  and  the  initial  economic  downturn,  the 
debt burden  rises significantly:  The ratio of private  debt to output  rises 
4. Romer  (1993)  similarly  finds that real  rates  reached  roughly  9%  at this time, by construct- 
ing a measure of expected inflation  based on the producer  price index. 
5. Also relevant  according  to Temin  were differences  in the international  economic  climate: 
In the early 1920s the United States benefited from strong demand to facilitate  recon- 
struction  from  the war. By contrast,  export  demand  tanked  during  the Depression  as the 
industrialized  world fell into recession along with the United States in the early 1930s. 
Eichengreen  (1992)  further  emphasizes that the absence of the gold standard  in 1920- 
1921  reduced the synchronization  of downturns in 1920-1921  across  countries, relative 
to 1929-1931. Comment 243 
Table  2  ANNUAL INCREASE  IN THE  PRIVATE  DEBT  BURDEN  DUE TO 
DEFLATION:  THE  DEPRESSION  OF 1920-1921  VS. 1930-1931  AND 
1931-1932 
.~~~~  ..  ,  .  .  ,Annual  A  (%)  in 
Initial  private  debt 
Years  relative  to output  Price  level  Debt  burden  GNP 
1920-21  1.20  -14.80  20.85  -6.10 
1930-31  1.78  -9.23  18.12  -10.70 
1931-32  1.96  -10.17  22.16  -17.53 
from  1.5 in  1929 to 2.0 in  1931. Loan defaults  significantly  weaken  the 
capitalization  of commercial banks.  One  manifestation  of this distress  is 
a rise in the  number  of bank failures.  During  this  time,  Friedman  and 
Schwartz argue, the Federal Reserve could have taken action to stem the 
tide, but failed to do so. 
As  I noted  in  the  introduction,  unlike  1920-1921,  which  featured  a 
transitory period of simultaneous  falling prices and output,  the deflation 
of  1929-1933  sets  in largely  when  the  economy  has  already  weakened 
considerably,  after the initial contraction  of 1929-1930  described  above. 
The authors  instead  focus  on  the  role of the  debt  deflation  in the  first 
part of the  Depression.  To underscore  the  significance,  I redid  the  au- 
thors' calculation  of the  impact  of the  declining  price level  on  the  debt 
burden  (see  their Table 3), this  time beginning  in 1930, after the  initial 
downturn.  Also,  I consider  1920-1921  as the relevant period  to analyze 
the deflation  of that time,  in keeping  with  conventional  historical analy- 
sis.6 To keep  the  period  length  consistent,  I compare  1920-1921  with 
1930-1931  and 1931-1932. 
Table 2 reports the calculations.  Note that the rise in the debt burden is 
roughly  similar across years.  The percentage  output  contraction  in each 
of the  Depression  years  exceeds  the output  contraction  of 1920-1921- 
10.7% and  17.53% versus  6.1%. But the  difference  is far less  stark than 
what  obtains from the authors' analysis.7 After allowing  for other differ- 
6. Virtually every historical account I have read refers to the contraction of 1920-1921,  and 
not 1920-1922  as do the authors.  Note from the authors' Table 1 that private spending  is 
actually up relative to trend in 1922-overall  output  is down  only because  of a contrac- 
tion  in  government  spending  due  to  the  demilitarization  following  World War I. My 
guess  is  that  the  historical  literature presumes  that  given  that  the  decline  in  military 
spending  likely  reduced  potential  output,  it  does  not  seem  right  to  treat  1922 as  a 
recession  year. 
7. Also,  Friedman  and  Schwartz  (1963, p.  232) argue  that the  use  of annual  data greatly 
understates  the  severity  of  the  1920-1921  recession.  Specifically,  they  state:  ". . . al- 
though  this  contraction  was  relatively  brief-the  National  Bureau dates  the  trough  in 244  GERTLER 
ences  between  the two episodes  (e.g.,  vastly  different initial behavior  of 
household  spending,  different monetary  policy regimes,  different bank- 
ing  conditions),  the  relative  experiences  with  deflation  are  far  less 
anomalous  than the authors' analysis  suggests.8 
An  additional  key  difference  from  1920-1921-one  highlighted  by 
the  authors-is  the  development  of  the  banking  crisis.  In  the  next 
section  I address  the  authors'  contention  that banking  problems  were 
unimportant.  In the meantime,  I simply  observe  that there is consider- 
able  evidence  to  suggest  that  bank-dependent  borrowers,  including 
unincorporated  businesses  and  corporations  with  imperfect  access  to 
credit, as well  as households,  were  hit particularly hard during the first 
two  years  of the Depression.  According  to Fabricant (1934, 1935), busi- 
ness  losses  were  concentrated  mainly  among  small  and medium-sized 
firms.  Large  firms  on  average  made  profits  throughout  the  Depres- 
sion.9  Further,  it  is  not  the  case  that  firms  with  imperfect  access  are 
"small potatoes."  It is not unreasonable  to suggest  that unincorporated 
businesses  and  small  and  medium-sized  corporations  accounted  for 
between  half  to  two-thirds  of  GDP.10 Thus,  the  disruption  of  credit 
markets affected  a sizable  component  of the business  sector along  with 
households. 
2.3 SEPTEMBER  1931 
At this point,  as noted  above,  Britain abandoned  the gold standard.  The 
Federal Reserve  chose  to defend,  despite  the  severely  weakened  econ- 
omy  and despite  very high ex post  real interest rates. As a consequence, 
nominal  interest  rates rose 200 basis points  and ex post  real rates (using 
the  GNP  deflator)  climbed  to  10% (see  Figure 2). Shortly  afterward,  as 
Figure  1 shows,  industrial  production  began  a free fall, and  what  had 
been  a severe  recession  turned  into  a depression.  Of course,  trying  to 
July 1921-it  ranks  as  one  of  the  severest  on  record.  Its brevity  makes  annual  data 
misleading  guides  to its severity." 
8. An additional difference was that the deflation in 1920-1921 was preceded by a large run- 
up in prices. To the extent debt contracts were long-term,  a good fraction of the effect of 
the deflation on real debt burdens  simply  offset the effect of the earlier inflation.  By way 
of contrast, the deflation  during the Depression  followed  a long period of price stability. 
9. The positive  relationship  between  size  and  profitability  during  the  Depression  holds 
even  after  controlling  for industry.  See  Table 6 in  Fabricant (1935). Bemanke  (1983) 
also  emphasizes  the heterogeneous  performance  of firms across  size  class  during  the 
Depression. 
10. Unincorporated  businesses  accounted  for roughly  a third of GDP. Small and medium- 
sized  corporations  accounted  for anywhere  between  a quarter and  a half  of  overall 
corporate business.  For example,  firms under $50 million in assets-Fabricant's  thresh- 
old  for large firms-accounted  for 53% of total corporate receipts  in 1931 and 40% of 
the  total  corporate  capital  stock.  Firms  under  $5  million  in  assets-clearly  smaller 
firms-accounted  for 40% of total corporate receipts and 25% of total corporate capital. 
Source: Historical Statistics. Comment 245 
infer causality  with  a single  time-series  observation  is dangerous.  It is 
precisely  at this juncture,  however,  that the cross-country  evidence  pro- 
vided  in  Eichengreen  (1992) and  Bernanke  and  James (1991) helps  re- 
solve the identification  problem: Countries  such as the United States that 
failed to abandon the gold standard early suffered more severe economic 
distress,  greater deflation,  and more severe  banking  and financial crises 
than  countries  such  as Britain that moved  relatively  quickly  to free up 
their  monetary  policy.  These  facts  held  not  only  for OECD  countries; 
Campa  (1990) showed  that  the  connection  between  adherence  to  the 
gold  standard and the severity  of the Depression  applied  equally well to 
Latin American countries. 
Again  it is important  to stress  differences  from 1920-1921.  Unlike the 
tightening  in this earlier period  that came on  the heels  of an economic 
boom,  the monetary tightening  in late 1931 was the culmination of a series 
of contractionary shocks to the economy  over the previous  two years that 
had  left both  real and  financial  economic  conditions  in a highly  fragile 
state. A tightening  that follows  a long period of duress may have a more 
potent  effect  than  otherwise,  since  precautionary  asset  holdings  and 
other insurance  mechanisms  that can help borrowers  with  imperfect  ac- 
cess to credit weather bad times may have dried up. It is arguable that the 
tightening  in late 1931 occurred exactly at this kind of point. 
2.4 SUMMARY 
To briefly  recapitulate:  To me,  the  evidence  suggests  that the  authors' 
simple  comparisons  of 1920-1921  and the Depression  are not adequate 
to  rule  out  debt-deflation  or  other  monetary  and  financial  factors  as 
having  a role in the Depression.  In addition  to completely  ignoring  the 
international  evidence,  the authors  do not take account of critical differ- 
ences  between  1920-1921  and  1929-1933,  including  the vastly  different 
initial conditions  influencing  household  spending  and differences  in the 
monetary  policy  regime,  as well  as the sustained  and cumulative  nature 
of the  contractionary  forces that was  a feature  of the  latter period,  but 
not the former. 
3.  The  Wage-Rigidity  Model 
Here  I argue  that by not  allowing  for any  kind  of nominal  rigidity  the 
authors  do not give  the wage-rigidity  hypothesis  fair due.  In particular, 
the  authors  consider  a  two-sector  intertemporal  general  equilibrium 
model.  Real wages  are fixed exogenously  in one sector, but flexible in the 
other.  Otherwise,  the  model  is  completely  frictionless.  To capture  the 
effect of rising real wages  during the Depression,  the authors  consider  a 246 *  GERTLER 
transitory  increase  in the real wage  in the fixed wage  sector. Not  much 
happens  in the  aggregate,  because  the  flexible  wage  sector  soaks  up  a 
fair amount  of the displaced  workers. 
It is not  at all clear why  the  authors  choose  this  particular model  to 
evaluate  the effect of wage  rigidity. Because the model  does not allow for 
nominal  wage  rigidity,  it  does  not  permit  the  kind  of  contraction  in 
aggregate demand that advocates  of the wage-rigidity  hypothesis  empha- 
size  as a way  to help  explain  the Depression.  In contrast,  Bordo, Erceg, 
and  Evans  (2000) show  that  by  allowing  for  staggered  nominal  wage 
setting,  a simple  monetary  model  can help explain  a good  fraction of the 
output  decline. 
The authors also treat the increase in the real wages  as if it came out of 
thin  air. One  might  think  a priori that the  source  of the  wage  increase 
should  be  relevant  to  the  choice  of  model  used  to  evaluate  the  issue. 
Here  the  international  evidence  sheds  some  light.  The  countries  that 
experienced  the  largest  increases  in  real  wages  were-as  might  be 
expected-those  that stayed  longest  on the gold standard. One interpre- 
tation then is that contractionary monetary policy, interacting with nomi- 
nal wage  rigidities,  produced  the  real wage  increases.  Specifically,  con- 
tractionary monetary  policy  helped  induce  the contraction  in aggregate 
activity and a corresponding  deflation.  With nominal  wages  a bit stickier 
than nominal  prices, real wages  increased.  If this interpretation  is indeed 
correct, then  a model  along  the lines  of Bordo, Erceg, and Evans would 
seem  more  appropriate  than  the  authors'  to  study  the  effect  of  wage 
rigidity. 11 
4.  The  Banking-Crisis  Model 
I now  address the authors' contention  that the banking crises were unim- 
portant.  I have  three  basic  concerns,  involving:  (1) potential  measure- 
ment of the overall contraction in banking,  (2) assumptions  of the model 
that constrain  its ability to produce  a crisis, and (3) identification  issues 
in the cross-state  banking  analysis. 
4.1 MEASUREMENT  OF THE  DECLINE  IN BANK 
LENDING CAPACITY 
The authors use deposits  of failed banks to measure  the decline  in bank- 
ing services.  A problem with this measure is that it does not take account 
of  the  decline  in  lending  capacity  of  banks  that  continue  to  operate. 
11. It may also be necessary to allow for countercyclical  markups and/or some form of 
labor-market  friction  that produces  real-wage  rigidity  in order  to generate  a sufficiently 
high elasticity  of output with respect  to the real  wage. Comment 247 
Indeed,  the convention  in the banking  literature is to use  the decline  in 
bank capital as an indicator of the contraction in lending  capacity. 
To see  the relevance  of capital, consider  a typical bank balance sheet. 
On the asset  side  are loans  and securities.  Liabilities consist  of deposits 
plus  capital. Capital serves  as a buffer to protect  the return on deposits 
against  loan losses.  In practice, the quantity  of bank capital influences  a 
bank's  ability  to  acquire  uninsured  deposits.  In this  way,  it affects  its 
lending  capacity.  Evidence  from  bank-level  panel  data  from  both  the 
modern  era (eg.,  Bernanke  and  Lown,  1991) and the  Depression  (e.g., 
Calomiris  and  Berry, 1998) suggests  a quantitatively  significant  link be- 
tween  bank  capitalization  and  bank  lending.  Accordingly  the  contrac- 
tion  of bank  capital  likely  provides  a better  measure  of  the  decline  in 
bank lending  services  than the deposit  measure  the authors use. 
One  complication  is  that bank  capital  is  usually  measured  in book- 
rather than market-value  terms. However,  recent work by Calomiris and 
Berry  (1998)  obtains  evidence  on  the  contraction  of  both  market  and 
book values  during the Depression  for a sample of New  York City banks. 
If we  use  the New  York City data as a guide  to correcting the aggregate 
book-value  numbers,  then  a crude estimate  of the decline  in the market 
value of bank capital is approximately  50%. Accordingly,  using capital as 
a measure  of lending  capacity,  as is consistent  with  the banking  litera- 
ture,  suggests  a much  larger  decline  than  the  authors'  deposit-based 
measure  of 15%. 
4.2 THE  MODEL 
While the authors' framework  may be interesting  as a model  of financial 
intermediation,  it is not  clear that it is particularly  useful  for studying 
crises. Within the model,  a particular input requires bank finance.  A key 
limitation-if  the  model  is to be used  to study  crises-is  that all other 
factors (labor, etc.)  remain  fixed  in the wake  of the  shock.  This greatly 
constrains  the ability of a banking  crises to generate  a contraction in real 
activity. 
I illustrate this point with a very simple model.  Let X denote  a variable 
factor that requires bank finance  (e.g.,  inventories),  and  0 be the service 
flow from this input. Let L (e.g. labor) be another variable input. Output  Y 
is then given by a simple Cobb-Douglas  production  function,  as follows: 
Y =  (OX)aL1-. 
Note that, holding  L constant,  the elasticity of output with respect to X is 
given  by the cost share: 248 *  GERTLER 
axY  /  L 
The  authors  then  proceed  to  analyze  a banking  crisis,  as  follows. 
Suppose  that B is the quantity of available bank loans.  A shock to bank- 
ing  arises  that  reduces  B below  its  frictionless  equilibrium  value.  X, 
accordingly,  is  constrained  to  equal  B,  and  the  decline  in  B exactly 
matches  the decline  in X. Importantly, no other factors adjust during the 
crisis. Given  this assumption,  the percentage  decline  in output  due to a 
percentage  contraction in bank lines is simply  given by the cost share; in 
simple  terms,  X =  B implies 
8YB  a. 
a  B Y /  L 
To compute  the  overall  decline  in  output  from  the  banking  crisis,  the 
authors  multiply  the  cost  share  a  by  their  measure  of  the  percentage 
decline in banking of x percent. Since the cost share of banking in the GDP 
is a tiny number, the authors conclude  that the banking crisis did not have 
much  effect. 
I stress,  however,  that the  assumption  that all other  factors are held 
constant  is key to justifying  the cost share as the measure  of the output 
elasticity  with  respect  to bank loans.  Suppose  instead  that labor is per- 
fectly  elastic  in supply  at the wage  w. Then  it is easy  to show  that the 
effect  of a banking  crisis on  output  may be  considerably  larger. In this 
instance  the relevant  output  elasticity  is given by 
aY B 
aB Y 
Here output  drops proportionally  with bank loans.12 Further, if the elas- 
ticity of lending  with respect to capital is roughly  unity (which presumes 
that banks  maintain  a stable  ratio of  capital  to  loans),  then  given  my 
estimate  of a roughly  50% decline in bank capital and my (overly) simple 
model,  the banking  crisis could have produced  a decline  in output  of up 
12. The  elasticity  is  lower  if there  are diminishing  returns.  It is higher,  however,  if the 
elasticity  of substitution  between  the bank-financed  input and the other variable inputs 
is  lower.  It will  also  be  higher  if  there  are  overhead  financing  costs,  since  in  this 
instance  a given  percentage  reduction  in banking  lending  will  imply  a proportionally 
greater decline  in funds  available to finance the variable input. Comment 249 
to 50% for bank-dependent  firms.  I would  add  that this calculation  ig- 
nores  the potential  impact on household  spending. 
I am not suggesting  that anyone  take my model  seriously.  My point is 
only to illustrate that the authors' connection  between  the cost share and 
the  impact  of  a banking  crisis  rests  on  the  assumption  that  the  crisis 
makes no impact on other factors of production.  True, my assumption  of 
perfectly  elastic factor supply  is extreme.  On the other hand,  during the 
Great  Depression  there  was  a  huge  contraction  in  employment  with 
relatively  little  movement  in  real  wages.  This  elastic-like  behavior  of 
employment  was  surely  not  a  simple  consequence  of  preferences. 
Rather, it likely reflected labor-market frictions in conjunction  with other 
forces.  The key  point  is that  a proper  evaluation  of the  banking  crisis 
likely  requires taking into  account  other frictions,  such  as labor-market 
rigidities,  possibly  including  nominal  as well  as real rigidities,  that open 
up  the  possibility  of  large  output  fluctuations.  The  mere  fact  that  a 
banking  shock  doesn't  do much  in an otherwise  frictionless  framework 
does  not imply that it will be unimportant  once the frictions outside  the 
banking  sector are properly  taken into account. 
4.3 CROSS-STATE  BANKING  EVIDENCE 
Examining  the  link  between  banking  performance  and  output  across 
states is in principle a good idea. Several problems  confound  the identifi- 
cation, however.  As I have mentioned,  the loss of bank capital is likely a 
better measure  of the decline in lending  capacity than are the deposits  of 
failed banks. A state could have a banking industry in poor health due to 
low capitalization,  but few banks that actually fail. (This is more likely to 
be true for states with  large banks,  since regulators are more likely to let 
small banks fail than large ones.)  Accordingly,  measurement  error in the 
authors'  independent  variable  (banking lending  capacity)  could  be one 
factor responsible  for the lack of explanatory  power. 
Second,  there  is  likely  unobserved  heterogeneity  across  states.  For 
example,  midwestern  states are dominated  by durable-goods  industries. 
Not  controlling  for  this  difference  will  bias  the  results.  Finally,  high 
integration  of state economies  also inhibits  identification.  A contraction 
in bank activity in Illinois that reduces  demand  for automobiles  will lead 
to a contraction in Michigan  output. 
The  authors'  case  would  be  more  compelling  if they  set  up  the  hy- 
pothesis  test  so  that  the  argument  they  prefer  requires  a  finding  of 
statistical significance.  But doing  it the  other way  around-having  vic- 
tory depend  on the absence  of statistical  significance-implies  a test of 
low  power:  Absence  of statistical  significance  could  reflect a variety  of 
factors having  nothing  to do with  the authors' argument. 250 ?  GERTLER 
Figure  3 Baa  GOVERNMENT-BOND  SPREAD 
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5. Risk  Spreads,  Dividends,  and  Japan 
I now  tie up some  loose  ends  regarding  the authors' discussion  of finan- 
cial  factors  involving  risk  spreads  and  dividend  behavior  during  the 
Depression  and  also the Japanese stock-market  crash of the early 1990s. 
5.1 RISK  SPREADS 
One  traditional  indicator  of the  steady  deterioration  of financial  condi- 
tions  throughout  the  Depression  is the behavior  of the spread  between 
Baa corporate  bonds  and  long-term  government  bonds.  As  Figure  3 
indicates,  this spread  rises from roughly  200 basis points  in early 1929 to 
between  600 and  700 basis  points  in  the  wake  of  the  September  1931 
monetary  tightening.  The  rise  in  the  spread  correlates  well  with  the 
onset  of debt  deflation  and  the banking  crises.  Note  further the  nearly 
300-basis-point  jump  in the  spread  in the interval between  the banking 
crises and the wake  of the subsequent  monetary  tightening. 
The  authors  argue  that  the  movement  in  the  spread  simply  reflects 
expected  default  costs.  This observation  alone,  however,  does  not  rule 
out a role for financial  factors.  To the  extent  there are losses  associated 
with  bankruptcy,  expected  default  costs  entail  an agency  premium  for 
external finance.13 
13. In this instance,  the agency  cost of external finance equals  the default probability times 
the deadweight  cost associated  with bankruptcy. Comment  . 251 
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Leaving aside the question  of whether  there are significant bankruptcy 
costs,  however,  it is very unlikely  that expected  default costs alone could 
account  for the  sharp  rise in the  spread.  As  Figure 4 indicates,  default 
rates on Baa bonds  were  relatively  low  during  the Depression,  peaking 
at just  1.5% in  1933.14 This  low  default  rate should  not  be  surprising: 
Even though  Baa is not the highest  rating possible,  it is nonetheless  an 
investment-grade  classification,  a status achievable  only if the likelihood 
of default is quite small.15 It is also important to recognize  that the bonds 
are  long-term-the  average  maturity  in  Moody's  sample  is  between 
twenty  and thirty years-implying  that the spread depends  not only on 
the  expected  default  probability  in  any  given  year,  but  rather on  the 
expected  average  annual  default  probability  over the  life of the bond.16 
The low  average  annual  default  probabilities  portrayed  in Figure 4 sug- 
14. I thank Richard  Cantor  for supplying me with the Moody's default-rate  data. 
15. To  gain some perspective, the default  rate  on Aaa  bonds was effectively  zero during  the 
Depression. Defaults were concentrated  mainly among speculative (non-investment- 
grade)  securities. 
16. To get some sense of the significance  of maturity  for the spread, consider a discount 
bond that pays either 1.0 with probability  1 -  Ir after T periods or 0.5 with probability 
,r. Suppose further  that investors are risk-neutral  and that the riskless  rate  is fixed at R 
> 1. Then it is straightforward  to show that the rate spread  between the risky  bond and 
riskless security may be expressed as ir/T x 0.5. Note that ir is the cumulative  default 
probability  and that ir/T is the annual average default probability.  For T =  20, for 
example, an annual average default probability  of 1.5%-a  number well above the 
annual average for Baa-rated  bonds-would  generate  a spread of only 75 basis points. 252 *  GERTLER 
gests  that expected  defaults  cannot  come  close  to explaining  300-400- 
basis-point  jump in the spread.17 
One  possibility  is that the spread  might  have  reflected  the likelihood 
of a Baa-rated firm being  reclassified  into a higher  default-rate  category. 
However,  the risk associated  with  non-investment-grade  Ba bonds  (the 
quality-level  below  Baa) appears  too  low  to rationalize  downgrade  risk 
being  a factor in the  Baa spread.  As  Figure 4 illustrates,  the  Ba default 
rate peaked  at 7% in  1932, before  settling  back to a low  level  by  1936. 
Annual  default  rates on Ba bonds  of this magnitude  do not appear able 
to raise expected  default  costs  on  Baa bonds  sufficiently  to explain  the 
spread  for the highest-rated  Baa bonds,  especially  given  that the proba- 
bility of being  reclassified  from Baa to Ba was  likely not huge.18 Finally, 
note  that the issue  of ratings  downgrades  also cuts the other way:  The 
measured  spread may significantly  understate  the true rise in the spread 
to the extent that firms in distress  were  downgraded  from Baa and thus 
dropped  from the sample  used  to construct the average  Baa rate. 
What then  accounts  for the sharp rise in the spread  over this period? 
Friedman  and  Schwartz  argue  that much  of  it reflected  an  increasing 
liquidity  premium  that was  due  to capital-constrained  banks unloading 
their holdings  of Baa bonds  on the open  market, especially  in the wake 
of the banking crises and subsequent  monetary  tightening.19 Apparently, 
the  same  Baa bonds  intermediated  by banks  commanded  a larger pre- 
mium  when  floated  on  the  open  market.  This suggests  that the  move- 
ments  in the spread indeed  reflected financial distress  and, among  other 
things,  that the  contraction  in banking  was  indeed  affecting  real credit 
costs. 
5.2  DIVIDENDS 
The authors  argue that firms on the whole  greatly smoothed  dividends 
throughout  the Depression,  suggesting  an absence of financial distress.  I 
agree  that  dividend  behavior  is  an  important  issue,  but  question  the 
17. The idea that expected  default costs explain little of the movement  in the risk spread on 
corporate bonds  is consistent  with recent evidence.  See, for example,  Elton et al. (2001). 
18. The increase in the probability of default from downgrade  risk equals the probability of 
downgrade  times  the  difference  in the default  rate between  the higher  and the lower 
risk class.  Elton et al. show  that the annual probability of a downgrade  from Baa to Ba 
was  only  5.4% over  1987-1996,  the  period  when  the  corporate  default  rate was  the 
highest  since  the  time  of the  Depression.  While  this transition  probability  was  surely 
higher  in the Depression,  it is safe to say that it was  still considerably  less  than unity, 
particularly for the bonds  in the Moody's  sample  (since the latter tends  to drop bonds 
selling  at a deep  discount.) 
19. Friedman  and Schwartz  (1963, p.  312) state: "Interest rates clearly show  the effects  of 
the banking crisis.  . . The yield on corporate bonds  rose sharply, the yields  on govern- 
ment  bonds  began  to fall. The reason  is clear. In their search for liquidity, banks  and 
others were  inclined  first to dispose  of their lower grade bonds." Comment 253 
authors'  claim,  for  three  basic  reasons:  (1)  Though  there  was  con- 
siderable  smoothing  in the early stages  of the Depression,  firms did cut 
dividends  significantly  after 1930. (2) A simple  comparison  of total div- 
idends  with  total corporate profits significantly  overstates  the degree  of 
dividend  smoothing,  due  to  an  aggregation  bias.  Firms with  positive 
profits, mainly large firms, accounted  for most of the aggregate dividend 
payments;  small  and  medium-sized  firms that experienced  substantial 
losses  could  not  cut  dividends  below  zero.  (3) The  residual  dividend 
smoothing  (mainly by large firms) may have  in part reflected pressures 
from shareholders  who  themselves  faced financial distress. 
To gain  some  perspective,  Table 3 reports  the  behavior  of  nominal 
dividends  relative to nominal  personal income.  Consistent  with conven- 
tional wisdom,  a buildup  of retained earnings over the late 1920s permit- 
ted  corporations  to keep  dividends  relatively  stable  between  1929 and 
1930. After 1930, however,  dividends  dropped  sharply not only in abso- 
lute  terms,  but  also  in  comparison  with  the  overall  drop  in  personal 
income.  In 1930, dividends  were roughly  7.1% of total personal  income. 
By 1933 the  ratio drops  by  roughly  40%, to 4.3%. Thus,  the  aggregate 
evidence  does  suggest  significant  dividend  cuts. 
Why  didn't  dividends  fall to zero? First, the  aggregation  bias is rele- 
vant.  Even though  total profits became  negative  after 1930, a significant 
fraction of firms continued  to earn positive  profits. Table 4, for example, 
shows  that corporate income-tax  payments  remained  positive  through- 
out  the  Great Depression,  suggesting  that a core of firms were  indeed 
earning  money  over  this  entire  time  period.  Fabricant (1934) presents 
direct estimates  of total earnings of corporations with non-negative  prof- 
its along with total losses  by firms with negative  profits. As the Fabricant 
data  make  clear, the  drop  in aggregate  profits  over  the  period  in part 
reflected  a fraction of firms each year drifting from positive  to negative 
profits.  Since dividends  are bounded  below  at zero,  total dividends  may 
drop less than proportionally  to total profits simply  in part due to aggre- 
Table  3  CORPORATE  DIVIDENDS  AND PERSONAL  INCOME 
Corporate  Personal 
dividends  income  Ratio 
Year  ($million)  ($million)  (%) 
1929  5801  85,905  6.75 
1930  5468  77,015  7.10 
1931  4066  65,896  6.17 
1932  2544  50,150  5.07 
1933  2038  47,004  4.34 254 *  GERTLER 
Table 4  CORPORATE TAXES, PROFITS, AND  DIVIDENDSa 
Aggregate  Aggr. profits 
profits  (Y>  0) 
Aggr. profits  -taxes 
Year  before  taxes  Corp. taxes  Y >  0  Y <  0  -divs. 
1929  9,990  1,369  13,841  -3,851  6,671 
1930  3,697  842  7,987  -4,290  1,677 
1931  -372  498  4,801  -5,173  237 
1932  -2,309  385  2,800  -5,109  -129 
1933  956  521  3,789  -2,833  1,230 
aMillions  of dollars. 
gation bias (as opposed  to everything  being  accounted  for by individual 
firms actually smoothing  dividends). 
To gain some  sense  of the bias,  I used  the implied  average  corporate 
income-tax rate from the Fabricant data to construct estimates  of earnings 
by  corporations  with  positive  profits.20 Table 4 reports  these  estimates 
along with the difference between  the after-tax earnings of these corpora- 
tions  and  aggregate  dividends.  Note  that  throughout  the  Depression, 
(estimated)  aggregate  earnings  by  these  corporations  are  sufficient  to 
cover  dividends,  the  one  exception  being  a slight  shortfall  in  1932.21 I 
don't  mean  to  suggest  that  only  firms  with  positive  profits  paid  divi- 
dends,  but  rather that  the  bulk  of dividend  payments  came  from  this 
group and not, as the authors imply, firms with highly negative  earnings. 
Indeed,  according to Fabricant, it was mainly large firms with positive 
earnings  that continued  to pay dividends  throughout  the Depression.22 
20. To construct  the average tax rates I divided Fabricant's  (1934)  estimates of total corpo- 
rate taxes (see his Table 1) by profits of corporations  with positive earnings (see his 
Table  2). Since his data only go through  1932,  I used for 1933  the same implied average 
tax rate as for 1932. The average tax rates I used accordingly  for 1929-1933 are 9.89, 
10.54, 10.37, 13.75, and 13.75. To  then get the estimate of total profits  for corporations 
with positive earnings I divided the national income and product accounts (NIPA) 
measure  of corporate  income taxes by the estimated  average  tax rates. Note that Fabri- 
cant's measures of total corporate  income, dividends, and taxes differ a bit from the 
NIPA  data, since the former  do not eliminate  double counting from cross-holdings  of 
stock. Finally,  my calculations  do not adjust  for inventory  valuation  adjustment,  which 
implies that profits  are understated  somewhat for 1929-1932  and overstated  somewhat 
for 1933. 
21. Fabricant  (1935)  estimates  that  net saving of firms  with positive profits  in 1932  was $132 
million, suggesting that a small portion of aggregate dividends was paid by firms 
making  losses, but that on the whole firms  with positive profits  accounted  for the bulk 
of dividend payments. 
22. Examples  of industries  in which  large firms were  in a position  to maintain  a relatively 
steady flow of dividend payments include: food, tobacco, chemicals, public utilities, 
and communications. Comment 255 
The small and medium-sized  firms that experienced  heavy  losses  largely 
suspended  dividend  payments.  A look  at the  disaggregated  evidence, 
accordingly,  suggests  that firms in financial distress  were indeed  adjust- 
ing dividend  behavior  as one would  expect. 
Why  didn't  large companies  reduce  dividends  to zero? First, the fact 
that these  companies  on average maintained  positive  profits throughout 
the  Depression  suggests  that  they  were  at  least  capable  of  making 
payouts  without  dipping  into  capital.  Second,  cutting  dividends  is not 
costless,  especially  during  a period  where  shareholders  have  already 
experienced  significant  financial distress.  Pressure  to smooth  consump- 
tion  of  liquidity-constrained  shareholders  may  have  affected  dividend 
policy. 
In sum,  one  cannot  conclude,  from the simple  aggregate  evidence  on 
dividends  and profits  that the  authors  report,  that financial  constraints 
were  unimportant. 
5.3 JAPAN 
The authors present  some Japanese data from the time of the collapse  of 
the Nikkei  index  to suggest  that theories  which  emphasize  asset  prices 
as a source  of variation  in financial  conditions  were  not  likely  at work 
during  the Depression.  Here I argue that scratching just a bit below  the 
surface  leads  one  to  exactly  the  opposite  conclusion.  Again,  the  issue 
boils down  to taking account of all the relevant heterogeneity. 
The authors argue at the time of the decline in stock prices-from  early 
1990 to mid  1992-  Japanese output  did not drop significantly;  and they 
conclude  accordingly  that the  asset  price collapse  did not  make a large 
impact on the economy.  However,  extending  the sample period just a few 
years and disaggregating  the data yields a quite different scenario. Figure 
5 plots  the  behavior  of  four Japanese  series  over  the  period  1989:1 to 
1995:4: real output,  residential  investment,  nonresidential  investment, 
and  the  sum  of government  purchases  and  net  exports.  Each series  is 
detrended  using the authors' procedure.  Each variable is normalized to be 
100 at the beginning  of the stock-market downturn.  Finally, the two verti- 
cal lines denote  the beginning  and end of the Nikkei collapse: 1990:1 and 
1992:2, respectively. 
Note  first that in the midst  of the crash residential  investment  drops 
precipitously.  By late 1992 it is down  25% relative to trend and remains in 
this rough  vicinity  for the next three years.  By late 1991, nonresidential 
investment  also begins  a sharp  decline.  It is  15% below  trend by early 
1993 and bottoms  out  at 25% below  trend  by  1994:1, remaining  at this 
level  for the  next  two  years.  The behavior  of investment  overall  is en- 
tirely consistent  with  financial theories. 256 *  GERTLER 
Figure  5 JAPANESE  GDP AND ITS  COMPONENTS:  1989:1-1995:4 
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precipitously  early on? Here iiti important  to account for a number of 
key  differences  from  Great  Depression.  First  in  contrast  to  the 
significantly  over the early 1990s, particularly public investment  expendi- 
standard,  depreciation  of the yen  over this time helped  induce  a rise in 
Japa5  .s  tt  t  s  o  g  r  t 
ing  ad  t  rts  rose  steady  fm  eary  10  to  eary  , reachin 
public  guarantees,  which  permitted  lending  to  continue  through  the 
early  1990s,  even  though  the  collapse  of  both  stock  and  land  prices 
dkey  differened  bnk  bncea  t  Depression.  First,  in  contrast  to  the 
United  States durin  Japanese banking  surfaced  (segover,  e.g.,ment  spending  rose 
significantly  over  the earlypoint990s,  particularly public investment  expendi- 
tures.  Second,  while  U.S.  monetary  policy  was  constrained  by the gold 
standard,  depreciation  of the yen  over this time helped  induce  a rise in 
Japanese net exports.  Figure 5 shows  that the sum of government  spend- 
ing and net exports  rose steadily  from early 1990 to early 1993, reaching 
more  than  15% above  trend  at  this  time.  This  additional  source  of 
stimulus--which  did not arise in the Depression--helped  moderate  the 
overall impact of the contraction in domestic  investment. 
Finally, unlike  the  laissez-faire  banking  system  in  the  United  States 
during the 1930s, the Japanese banking  system  was heavily  protected by 
public  guarantees,  which  permitted  lending  to  continue  through  the 
early  1990s,  even  though  the  collapse  of  both  stock  and  land  prices 
directly  weakened  bank balance  sheets.  By  1993, however,  the  severe 
problems  in Japanese banking  surfaced  (see,  e.g.,  Hoshi  and Kashyap, 
1999). Only  at this point  do significant  constraints  on banking  activities Comment  257 
begin.  In contrast,  U.S.  banks  during  the Depression  did not enjoy this 
period  of protection  from the initial financial crisis. 
Once  the banking  problems  were  no longer  contained,  Japanese out- 
put  began  a  steady  contraction.  By  early  1993 output  was  5% below 
trend,  dropping  to 10% below  trend by the end  of 1995. The stagnation 
continues,  and many  observers  cite the weak  financial  system  as a key 
factor. 
The descriptive  evidence  I have just cited,  of course,  does  not  prove 
that financial  factors were  at work  in Japan. But nor does  the  authors' 
simple  evidence  suggest  otherwise.  More systematic  empirical  work  is 
required to resolve  the issue. 
6.  Concluding  Remarks 
Elsewhere  the  authors  have  done  interesting  work  on  the  Depression. 
Cole and Ohanian  (2000) propose  an interesting  explanation  of why  the 
slump persisted  for nearly six years after 1933, based  on reduced  compe- 
tition  induced  by  New  Deal  regulatory  policies.  The  purpose  of  the 
current paper, however,  is simply  to try to dismiss  monetary  and finan- 
cial theories  of the 1929-1933  downturn,  without  offering a clear alterna- 
tive to judge.  In my opinion,  the authors  do not succeed. 
It is critical, however,  to develop  a quantitative  model  to show  that 
monetary  and financial factors can indeed  account for the key features of 
the Depression.  I would  guess  that such a framework would  likely have 
to  incorporate  all of  the  following  features:  (1) some  form  of nominal 
rigidity, and possibly  also a real labor-market rigidity, to permit a signifi- 
cant contraction  in  aggregate  demand  in conjunction  with  a relatively 
small movement  in real wages;  (2) a central bank constrained  by a gold 
standard; and (3) frictions in the credit market that can disrupt spending 
by  households  and  small  and  medium-sized  firms.  Perhaps  one  new 
lesson  from this discussion  for modern  business-cycle  theories  that fea- 
ture  monetary  and  financial  factors  is  that  more  emphasis  should  be 
placed  on how  credit-market frictions may  constrain household  spend- 
ing,  given  the key role of the collapse  of consumer  demand  in the early 
stages  of the Depression. 
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Hal Cole  and Lee Ohanian  began  by replying  to the discussants.  There 
was  agreement  about the need  for general equilibrium  modeling  of the 
Depression.  In response  to Mark Gertler, Cole  agreed  that small  firms 
faced severe financial distress; but if many large firms were solvent,  why Discussion  *  259 
didn't they take over the small firms, their markets, or both? In response 
to Michael  Bordo,  Ohanian  noted  that the  small  effects  found  by  their 
wage-rigidity  model were not due to a lack of intrinsic persistence  in the 
model,  but rather resulted  from partial-equilibrium  employment  effects 
being  partially undone  by general  equilibrium  effects.  Ohanian  also re- 
emphasized  the problems with  1930s wage  data, citing Stanley Lebergott 
on the potential  importance  of compositional  effects.  Specifically, if low- 
paid  workers  (or employees  of  small  firms,  which  paid  lower  wages) 
were  more likely to lose  their jobs,  then  aggregate  wage  data overstate 
the increase in the real wage  of the typical worker. 
Beginning  the general  discussion,  Rick Mishkin  argued  for a broader 
interpretation  of  financial  shocks,  which  would  take  into  account  the 
deterioration of balance sheets  as well as banking problems.  To the extent 
that  households  and  firms  were  in  financial  distress  in  the  1930s,  in- 
creased  moral hazard  in credit relationships  would  have  reduced  their 
access  to credit. Cole argued  that the Japanese experience  of the  1990s, 
following  the  boom  and bust  in Japanese  asset  prices,  suggests  that  a 
sustained  slowdown  in growth,  rather than a collapse  of output,  is the 
likely  result of balance-sheet  problems.  Ben Friedman criticized  the  as- 
sumption  of the paper that the importance of bank credit to the economy 
could be measured by the share of banking in value added; he argued that 
credit may play  an essential  role that is not well  captured  by a smooth 
neoclassical  production  function.  Diego  Comin  noted  that  total  factor 
productivity  declined  sharply during the Depression,  a fact that might be 
construed  in support  of a real-side  interpretation  of the collapse. 
Robert Gordon  emphasized  the  difficulty  of disentangling  cause  and 
effect in an environment  when  all sectors of the economy  are contracting 
simultaneously;  he argued for more use of cross-national  comparisons  to 
identify  causal  factors.  He  also pointed  out that,  even  though  invento- 
ries are a small  part of the  economy,  changes  in inventory  investment 
play  a  large  role  in  fluctuations.  The  fact  that  banks  finance  a  large 
portion  of  inventories  suggests  another  possible  channel  of  influence 
from banks  to  the  real economy.  On  the  cross-state  evidence  on  bank 
failures, Gordon noted  that "this is one economy"; that is, we would  not 
necessarily  expect  the severity  of the Depression  to differ greatly across 
states even  if the incidence  of bank failures differed geographically. 
Susanto  Basu suggested  an alternative banking  model  in which  firms 
have  access  to two  technologies,  one  that uses  financial intermediation 
and is relatively efficient and one that does not use intermediation  and is 
less efficient.  If a firm is unable  to get a loan, it uses  the second  technol- 
ogy.  In this  model,  some  part of the  observed  TFP decline  reflects  the 
loss  of  financial  services;  further,  firms  forced  to  use  the  less  efficient 260 *  DISCUSSION 
technology  will want less capital and may choose  to liquidate part of the 
firm.  Pierre  Gourinchas  cautioned  that  general  equilibrium  models  of 
the  Depression  might  not  be  able  to  employ  the  usual  technique  of 
approximating  around  the  steady  state,  as  the  deviations  from  the 
steady state in the 1930s were presumably  large and nonlinearities  might 
be  quite  important.  Ohanian  noted  that  the  relatively  simple  models 
used  in their paper permitted  exact solution  and did not require approxi- 
mations  around  the steady  state. 
Michael Woodford pointed  out that the paper's sticky-wage  model has 
the  highly  counterfactual  implication  that  unemployment  is  zero,  as 
workers  displaced  in  the  sticky-wage  sector  find  work  in  the  flexible- 
wage  sector.  He  also  noted  that  the  effects  of  higher  real  wages  on 
employment  depend  critically on the elasticity of marginal product with 
respect  to employment.  It may be that elasticity  is low  in the  short run 
(that is,  the  labor demand  curve  is flat) due  to factors such  as variable 
capital utilization; if so, relatively small changes  in real wages  could have 
large employment  effects. 
Ben Bernanke criticized the paper for ignoring  cross-country  evidence. 
According  to studies  encompassing  20-30  countries,  those countries  that 
left gold  earlier (and thus were  able to reflate their money  supplies  and 
price levels)  did better than those  that remained  on gold.  There is also 
some  cross-country  evidence  in favor of the banking hypothesis,  e.g.,  in 
his work with  Harold James. Bernanke also objected to the modeling  of 
the effects  of banking  crises; instead  of putting  financial  services  in the 
production  function,  he  prefers  an  approach  that  allows  for increased 
agency costs of lending  when  financial conditions  deteriorate. Comment- 
ing further on the model  of banking,  he pointed  out that intermediation 
services  affect  spending  as  well  as  production;  for example,  if buffer- 
stock  consumers  face  increased  unemployment  risk  while  simulta- 
neously  losing  access  to  credit,  they  are likely  to  sharply  reduce  their 
spending.  If financial  distress  affects  spending  more  than  production, 
the lack of correlation between  bank failures and production  at the state 
level  is  not  surprising,  as  already  suggested  by  Bob Gordon;  for  ex- 
ample,  if financial  distress  reduces  the demand  for automobiles  in Ala- 
bama,  output  in Michigan  rather than in Alabama will be most  affected. 
Finally, Bernanke noted  several  differences  between  the experiences  of 
1920-1921  and 1929-1933;  these  included  (1) the fact that the 1920-1921 
deflation,  unlike  the later deflation,  followed  a sharp inflation  that was 
widely  expected  to be  temporary  and  (2) institutional  changes  in labor 
markets  that reduced  wage  flexibility  and  increased  labor hoarding  in 
the latter episode. 